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Reviewing and Improving the Gaussian Mechanism
for Differential Privacy
Jun Zhao, Teng Wang, Tao Bai, Kwok-Yan Lam, Zhiying Xu, Shuyu Shi, Xuebin Ren, Xinyu Yang, Yang Liu, Han Yu
Abstract—Differential privacy provides a rigorous framework
to quantify data privacy, and has received considerable
interest recently. A randomized mechanism satisfying
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (DP) roughly means that, except
with a small probability δ, altering a record in a dataset cannot
change the probability that an output is seen by more than a
multiplicative factor eǫ. A well-known solution to (ǫ, δ)-DP is
the Gaussian mechanism initiated by Dwork et al. [1] in 2006
with an improvement by Dwork and Roth [2] in 2014, where a
Gaussian noise amount
√
2 ln 2
δ
× ∆
ǫ
of [1] or
√
2 ln 1.25
δ
× ∆
ǫ
of [2] is added independently to each dimension of the query
result, for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆. Although both classical
Gaussian mechanisms [1], [2] explicitly assume 0 < ǫ ≤ 1
only, our review finds that many studies in the literature have
used the classical Gaussian mechanisms under values of ǫ
and δ where we show the added noise amounts of [1], [2] do
not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP. We obtain such result by analyzing the
optimal (i.e., least) Gaussian noise amount σDP-OPT for (ǫ, δ)-DP
and identifying the set of ǫ and δ where the noise amounts of
classical Gaussian mechanisms are even less than σDP-OPT. The
inapplicability of mechanisms of [1], [2] to large ǫ can also be
seen from our result that σDP-OPT for large ǫ can be written as
Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
, but not Θ
(
1
ǫ
)
.
Since σDP-OPT has no closed-form expression and needs to
be approximated in an iterative manner, we propose Gaussian
mechanisms by deriving closed-form upper bounds for σDP-OPT.
Our mechanisms achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for any ǫ, while the classical
Gaussian mechanisms [1], [2] do not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for large
ǫ given δ. Moreover, the utilities of our proposed Gaussian mech-
anisms improve those of the classical Gaussian mechanisms [1],
[2] and are close to that of the optimal yet more computationally
expensive Gaussian mechanism.
Since most mechanisms proposed in the literature for (ǫ, δ)-DP
are obtained by ensuring a condition called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy (pDP), we also present an extensive discussion
of (ǫ, δ)-pDP including deriving Gaussian noise amounts to
achieve it.
To summarize, our paper fixes the literature’s long-time misuse
of Gaussian mechanism [1], [2] for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and
provides a comprehensive study for the Gaussian mechanisms.
Index Terms—Differential privacy, Gaussian mechanism, prob-
abilistic differential privacy, data analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy. Differential privacy [3] has received
considerable interest [1], [4]–[11] since it provides a rigor-
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ous framework to quantify data privacy. Roughly speaking,
a randomized mechanism achieving (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
(DP) means that, except with a (typically small) probability
δ, altering a record in a dataset cannot change the probability
that an output is seen by more than a multiplicative factor
eǫ. Formally, for D and D′ iterating through all pairs of
neighboring datasets which differ by one record, and for Y
iterating through all subsets of the output range of a random-
ized mechanism Y , the mechanism Y achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP if
P [Y (D) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫP [Y (D′) ∈ Y ]+δ, where P [·] denotes the
probability, and the probability space is over the coin flips of
the randomized mechanism Y . If δ = 0, the notion of (ǫ, δ)-
DP becomes ǫ-DP.
Classical Gaussian mechanisms [1], [2] to achieve
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Among various mechanisms to
achieve DP, the Gaussian mechanism for real-valued queries
initiated by [1] has received much attention, where a certain
amount of zero-mean Gaussian noise is added independently
to each dimension of the query result. Below, for a Gaussian
mechanism with parameter σ, we mean that σ is the standard
deviation of the Gaussian noise.
As shown in [1], [2], the noise amount in the Gaussian
mechanism scales with the ℓ2-sensitivity ∆ of a query, which
is defined as the maximal ℓ2 distance between the true query
results for any two neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ
in one record; i.e.,∆ = maxneighboring D,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2.
We will elaborate the notion of neighboring datasets in Re-
mark 1 on Page 4. For a query with ℓ2-sensitivity
1 ∆, the
noise amount in the first Gaussian mechanism proposed by
Dwork et al. [1] in 2006 to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP, denoted by
Dwork-2006, is given by
σDwork-2006 :=
√
2 ln 2δ × ∆ǫ . (1)
Improving Dwork-2006 via a smaller amount of noise
addition, the Gaussian mechanism by Dwork and Roth [2]
in 2014, denoted by Dwork-2014, adds Gaussian noise with
standard deviation
σDwork-2014 :=
√
2 ln 1.25δ × ∆ǫ . (2)
Both Page 6 in [1] for Dwork-2006 and Theorem A.1
on Page 261 in [2] for Dwork-2014 consider ǫ ≤ 1. We
will formally prove that Dwork-2006 and Dwork-2014
fail to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for large ǫ given δ. Moreover, we
will show in Section III that many studies [7], [8], [12]–
1For p = 1, 2, . . ., the ℓp-sensitivity of a query Q is defined as the maximal
ℓp distance between the outputs for two neighboring datasets D and D
′ that
differ in one record: ∆Q,p = maxneighboringD,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D
′)‖p .
2[21] applying Dwork-2006 and Dwork-2014 neglect the
condition ǫ ≤ 1, and use Dwork-2006 or Dwork-2014
under values of ǫ and δ where the added Gaussian noise
amount actually does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP. This renders their
obtained results inaccurate.
One may wonder why we consider both mechanisms since
clearly it holds that
σDwork-2014 in Eq. (2) < σDwork-2006 in Eq. (1). (3)
The reason is as follows. Although Dwork-2014 achieves
higher utility than that of Dwork-2006 for the set of ǫ and δ
under which they both achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP, Dwork-2006 has
wider applicability than Dwork-2014; i.e., the set of ǫ and
δ where Dwork-2014 achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP is a strict subset
of the set of ǫ and δ where Dwork-2006 achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP.
Given the above, we discuss both mechanisms.
Our contributions. We make the following contributions
in this paper.
1) Failures of classical Gaussian mechanisms for large ǫ.
We prove (in Theorem 1 on Page 4) that the classical Gaus-
sian mechanisms Dwork-2006 of [1] and Dwork-2014
of [2] fail to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for large ǫ given δ. In
fact, we prove that for any Gaussian mechanism with noise
amount F (δ) × ∆ǫ for some function F (δ), there exists
a positive function G(δ) for any 0 < δ < 1 such that the
above Gaussian mechanism does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for
any ǫ > G(δ). The above result applies to Dwork-2006
and Dwork-2014, where the former specifies F (δ) as√
2 ln 2δ and the latter specifies F (δ) as
√
2 ln 1.25δ .
2) The literature’s misuse of classical Gaussian mecha-
nisms for large ǫ. After a literature review (in Table I
on Page 5), we find that many papers [7], [8], [12]–[21]
use the classical Gaussian mechanism Dwork-2006 or
Dwork-2014 under values of ǫ and δ where the added
noise amount actually does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP. This
makes their obtained results inaccurate.
3) An ǫ-independent upper bound and asympotics of the
optimal Gaussian noise amount for (ǫ, δ)-DP. We prove
(in Theorem 3 on Page 5) that the optimal (i.e., least)
Gaussian noise amount σDP-OPT for (ǫ, δ)-DP is always
less than ∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) , which does not depend on ǫ, where
inverf() denotes the inverse of the error function. This is
in contrast to the classical Gaussian mechanisms’ noise
amounts σDwork-2006 in Eq. (1) and σDwork-2014 in Eq. (2)
which scale with 1ǫ and tend to ∞ as ǫ → 0. In fact, we
prove that σDP-OPT given a fixed δ converges to its upper
bound ∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) as ǫ→ 0, and is2 Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
as ǫ→∞.
Also, we show that σDP-OPT given a fixed ǫ is Θ
(√
ln 1δ
)
as δ → 0.
4) Our Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy with closed-form expressions. Although the optimal
Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-DP has been proposed in
a very recent work [22], its noise amount σDP-OPT has
2A positive sequence x can be written as Θ(y) for a positive sequence y
if lim inf x
y
and lim sup x
y
are greater than 0 and smaller than ∞.
no closed-form expression and needs to be approximated
in an iterative manner. Hence, we propose new Gaussian
mechanisms (Mechanism 1 and Mechanism 2 in The-
orems 4 and 5 on Page 6) by deriving closed-form upper
bounds for σDP-OPT. We summarize the advantages of our
Gaussian mechanisms as follows.
i) As discussed, our Gaussian mechanisms have
closed-form expressions and are computationally
efficient than [22]’s optimal Gaussian noise amount,
which has no closed-form expression and needs to
be approximated in an iterative manner. In addition,
both numerical and experimental studies show that the
utilities of our Gaussian mechanisms are close to that
of the optimal yet more computationally expensive
Gaussian mechanism by [22].
ii) Our Gaussian mechanisms all achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for
any ǫ, while the classical Gaussian mechanisms
Dwork-2006 of [1] and Dwork-2014 of [2] were
proposed for only 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 and we show that they do
not achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP for large ǫ given δ, as noted in
Contribution 1) above.
iii) We prove (in Inequality (10) on Page 7) that the noise
amounts of our Gaussian mechanisms are less than that
of Dwork-2014 (and hence also less than that of
Dwork-2006), for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 where the proofs of
Dwork-2006 of [1] and Dwork-2014 of [2] require.
iv) For a subset of ǫ > 1 where Dwork-2014 happens
to work (Dwork-2014’s original proof requires ǫ ≤
1), experiments (in Figure 2 on Page 7) show that our
Mechanism 1 often adds noise amount less than that
of Dwork-2014.
5) (ǫ, δ)-Differential privacy versus (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic dif-
ferential privacy. Since most mechanisms proposed in the
literature for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (DP) are obtained
by ensuring a notion called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy (pDP), which requires the privacy loss random
variable to fall in the interval [−ǫ, ǫ] with probability at
least 1 − δ, we also investigate (ǫ, δ)-pDP, and show its
difference/relationship with (ǫ, δ)-DP (in Section VI on
Page 7). In particular, the minimal Gaussian noise amount
to achieve (ǫ, δ)-pDP given δ scales with 1ǫ as ǫ→ 0 (from
Theorem 7 on Page 8), while the minimal Gaussian noise
amount to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP given δ converges to its upper
bound ∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) as ǫ→ 0 (from Theorem 3 on Page 5).
Moreover, while clearly (ǫ, δ)-pDP implies (ǫ, δ)-DP, we
also prove that (ǫ, δ)-DP implies (ǫ∗,
δ(1+e−ǫ∗ )
1−eǫ−ǫ∗ )-pDP for
any ǫ∗ > ǫ.
6) Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy. For (ǫ, δ)-pDP, we also derive the optimal
Gaussian mechanism (in Theorem 6 on Page 8) which
adds the least amount of Gaussian noise (denoted by
σpDP-OPT). However, since σpDP-OPT has no closed-form
expression and needs to be approximated in an iterative
manner, we propose Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-pDP
(Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4 in Theorems 8 and 9
on Page 9) by deriving more computationally efficient
3upper bounds (in closed-form expressions) for σpDP-OPT.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
• Section II surveys related work.
• In Section III, we elaborate (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (DP)
and review the literature’s misuse of classical Gaussian
mechanisms.
• In Section IV, we discuss the optimal Gaussian mechanism
for (ǫ, δ)-DP, where the noise amount has no closed-form
expression.
• Section V presents our Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-DP
with closed-form expressions of noise amounts.
• Since most mechanisms proposed in the literature for
(ǫ, δ)-DP are obtained by ensuring a notion called (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy (pDP), Section VI is de-
voted to (ǫ, δ)-pDP, where we discuss the difference/re-
lationship between (ǫ, δ)-pDP and (ǫ, δ)-DP, and derive
the optimal Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-pDP, where the
noise amount has no closed-form expression. Then we pro-
pose Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-pDP with closed-form
expressions of noise amounts.
• In view that concentrated differential privacy [9] and related
notions [10], [23], [24] have recently been proposed as
variants of differential privacy, we show in Section VII
that achieving (ǫ, δ)-DP by ensuring one of these privacy
definitions gives Gaussian mechanisms worse than ours.
• Section VIII presents experimental results.
• We conclude the paper in Section IX.
Due to the space limitation, additional details including the
proofs are provided in the appendices of this supplementary
file.
Notation. Throughout the paper, P [·] denotes the probabil-
ity, and F [·] stands for the probability density function. The
error function is denoted by erf(), and its complement is
erfc(); i.e., erf(x) := 2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt and erfc(x) := 1−erf(x).
In addition, inverf() is the inverse of the error function, and
inverfc() is the inverse of the complementary error function.
II. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy. The notion of differential privacy
(DP) [3] has received much attention [25]–[30] since it pro-
vides a rigorous framework to quantify data privacy. The
Gaussian mechanism to achieve DP has been investigated
in [1], [2], while the Laplace mechanism is introduced in [3]
and the exponential mechanism is proposed in [31]. The Gaus-
sian (resp., Laplace) mechanism adds independent Gaussian
(resp., Laplace) noise to each dimension of the query result,
while the exponential mechanism can address non-numeric
queries. Recently, the following mechanisms to achieve DP
have been proposed: the truncated Laplacian mechanism [32],
the staircase mechanism [33], [34], and the Podium mecha-
nism [35]. Compared with these mechanisms, the Gaussian
mechanism is more friendly for composition analysis since
the privacy loss random variable (defined in Section VI on
Page 7) after composing independent Gaussian mechanisms
follows a Gaussian distribution, whereas the privacy loss
after composing independent truncated Laplacian mechanisms
(staircase mechanisms, or podium mechanisms) has a compli-
cated probability distribution.
Use of Gaussian mechanism. The Gaussian mecha-
nism has been used by Dwork et al. [27] to design algo-
rithms for privacy-preserving principal component analysis.
Nikolov et al. [28] leverage the Gaussian mechanism for
differentially private release of a k-way marginal query. The
Gaussian mechanism is also used by Hsu et al. [29] for
enabling multiple parties to distributedly solve convex op-
timization problems in a privacy-preserving and distributed
manner. Gilbert and McMillan [36] apply the Gaussian
mechanism to differentially private recovery of heat source
location. Bun et al. [37] employ the Gaussian mechanism to
derive a lower bound on the length of a combinatorial object
called a fingerprinting code, proposed by Boneh and Shaw [38]
for watermarking copyrighted content. Abadi et al. [26] apply
(ǫ, δ)-DP to stochastic gradient descent of deep learning, where
the Gaussian mechanism is used for adding noise to the
gradient. Recently, Liu [39] have presented a generalized
Gaussian mechanism based on the ℓp-sensitivity
1.
Probabilistic differential privacy. Most mechanisms pro-
posed in the literature for (ǫ, δ)-DP are obtained by en-
suring a notion called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
(pDP) [40], which requires the privacy loss random variable
to fall in the interval [−ǫ, ǫ] with probability at least 1 − δ.
For the formal definition and results discussed below, see
Section VI for details, where we present i) relations between
(ǫ, δ)-DP and (ǫ, δ)-pDP, ii) an analytical but not closed-form
expression for the optimal Gaussian mechanism (denoted by
Mechanism pDP-OPT) to achieve (ǫ, δ)-pDP, and iii) Gaus-
sian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-pDP, denoted by Mechanism 3
and Mechanism 4, respectively.
Other variants of differential privacy. Different vari-
ants of differential privacy have been proposed in the
literature recently, including mean-concentrated differential
privacy (mCDP) [9], zero-concentrated differential privacy
(zCDP) [10], Re´nyi differential privacy [23] (RDP), and
truncated concentrated differential privacy (tCDP) [24]. These
notions are more complex than (ǫ, δ)-DP, so we believe that
(ǫ, δ)-DP will still be used in many applications. Therefore, any
issue concerning the classical Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-
DP is worthy of serious discussions in the research community.
Moreover, we show in Section VII on Page 10 that achieving
(ǫ, δ)-DP by ensuring one of these privacy definitions (i.e.,
mCDP, zCDP, RDP, and tCDP) gives Gaussian mechanisms
worse than ours.
Composition. One of the appealing properties of differential
privacy is the composition property [2], meaning that the
composition of differentially private algorithms satisfies a
certain level of differential privacy. In Appendix P of this
supplementary file, we provide analyses for the composition
of Gaussian mechanisms. Our result is that for m queries
Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆m, if the
query result of Qi is added with independent Gaussian noise
of amount (i.e., standard deviation) σi, then the differential
privacy (DP) level for the composition of the m noisy answers
is the same as that of a Gaussian mechanism with noise
4amount σ∗ :=
(∑m
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
)−1/2
for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity
1. Let σDPǫ,δ be a Gaussian noise amount which achieves
(ǫ, δ)-DP for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1, where the expres-
sion of σDPǫ,δ can follow from classical Dwork-2006 and
Dwork-2014 of [1], [2] (when ǫ ≤ 1), the optimal one (i.e.,
DP-OPT), or our proposed mechanisms (i.e., Mechanism 1
and Mechanism 2). Then the above composition satisfies
(ǫ, δ)-DP for ǫ and δ satisfying σ∗ ≥ σDPǫ,δ with σ∗ defined
above.
III. (ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND USAGE OF THE
GAUSSIAN MECHANISM
The formal definition of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [1] is as
follows.
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-Differential privacy [1]). A randomized
algorithm Y satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, if for any two
neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ only in one record,
and for any possible subset of outputs Y of Y , we have
P [Y (D) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫ · P [Y (D′) ∈ Y] + δ. (4)
where P [·] denotes the probability of an event. If δ = 0, Y is
said to satisfy ǫ-differential privacy.
Remark 1 (Notion of neighboring datasets). Two datasets
D and D′ are called neighboring if they differ only in
one record. There are still variants about this. In the first
case, the size of D and D′ differ by one so that D′ is
obtained by adding one record to D or deleting one record
from D. In the second case, D and D′ have the same size
(say n), and have different records at only one of the n
positions. Finally, the notion of neighboring datasets can also
be defined to include both cases above. Our results in this
paper do not rely on how neighboring datasets are specifically
defined. In a differential privacy application, after the notion
of neighboring datasets is defined, what we need is just the ℓ2-
sensitivity∆ of a queryQ with respect to neighboring datasets:
∆ = maxneighboring datasets D,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2.
Theorem 1 below shows failures of the classical Gaussian
mechanisms [1], [2] for large ǫ.
Theorem 1 (Failures of the classical Gaussian mechanisms
of Dwork and Roth [2] and of Dwork et al. [1] to achieve
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for large ǫ). For a positive function
F (δ), consider a Gaussian mechanism which adds Gaussian
noise with standard deviation F (δ) × ∆ǫ to each dimension
of a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆. With an arbitrarily fixed
0 < δ < 1, as ǫ increases, the above Gaussian mechanism
does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for large enough ǫ
(specifically, for any ǫ > G(δ) with G(δ) being some positive
function). This result applies to the classical Gaussian mech-
anism Dwork-2014 of Dwork and Roth [2] and mechanism
Dwork-2006 of Dwork et al. [1], where the former specifies
F (δ) as
√
2 ln 1.25δ and the latter specifies F (δ) as
√
2 ln 2δ .
We formally prove Theorem 1 in Appendix B.
Remark 2. For the Gaussian mechanism Dwork-2014
of [2], the blue line in Figure 1(i) on Page 5 illustrates all
points (δ,G∗(δ)) such that Dwork-2014 does not achieve
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for ǫ > G∗(δ); e.g., G∗(10−3) =
7.47, G∗(10−4) = 8.00, G∗(10−5) = 8.43, and G∗(10−6) =
8.79. For the Gaussian mechanism Dwork-2006 of [1], the
blue line in Figure 1(ii) on Page 5 illustrates all points
(δ,G#(δ)) such that Dwork-2006 does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy for ǫ > G#(δ); e.g., G#(10
−3) = 8.51,
G#(10
−4) = 8.99, G#(10−5) = 9.39, and G#(10−6) =
9.73.
The literature’s misuse of the classical Gaussian mech-
anisms. After a literature review, we find that many pa-
pers [7], [8], [12]–[21] use the classical Gaussian mechanism
Dwork-2006 (resp., Dwork-2014) under values of ǫ and
δ where Dwork-2006 (resp., Dwork-2014) actually does
not achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Table I on Page 5 sum-
marizes selected papers which misuse the classical Gaussian
mechanism Dwork-2006 or Dwork-2014.
Usage of ǫ > 1. Although ǫ ≤ 1 is preferred in practical
applications, there are still cases where ǫ > 1 is used, so
it is necessary to have Gaussian mechanisms which apply to
not only ǫ ≤ 1 but also ǫ > 1. We discuss usage of ǫ > 1 as
follows. First, the references [7], [8], [12]–[21] in Table I have
used ǫ > 1. Second, the Differential Privacy Synthetic Data
Challenge organized by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [41] included experiments of ǫ as
10. Third, for a variant of differential privacy called local
differential privacy [42] which is implemented in several
industrial applications, Apple [43], [44] and Google [45] have
adopted ǫ > 1.
IV. THE OPTIMAL GAUSSIAN MECHANISM FOR
(ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
A recent work [22] of Balle and Wang in ICML 2018 an-
alyzed the optimal Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, where “optimal” means that the noise amount is the
least among Gaussian mechanisms. This optimal Gaussian
mechanism is also analyzed by Sommer et al. [46], where
the shape of the privacy loss is also discussed. Based on [22],
we present Theorem 2 below.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Gaussian mechanism for
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy). The optimal Gaussian mechanism
for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, denoted by Mechanism DP-OPT,
adds Gaussian noise with standard deviation σDP-OPT specified
below to each dimension of a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆.
(i) We derive σDP-OPT as follows based on Theorem 8 of Balle
and Wang [22]:
With a satisfying erfc (a)− eǫ erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ,
we get σDP-OPT :=
(a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
, (5)
where erfc() is the complementary error function.
For ǫ ≥ 0.01 and 0 < δ ≤ 0.05, we prove the following
results:
(ii) σDP-OPT >
∆√
2ǫ
.
(iii) σDP-OPT <
√
2 ln 12δ · ∆ǫ + ∆√2ǫ .
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Fig. 1: The shaded area in each subfigure represents the set of (ǫ, δ) where Mechanism Dwork-2014 (resp., Dwork-2006)
does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
TABLE I: Misuse of the Classical Gaussian Mechanisms in the Literature from 2014 to 2018.
Selected papers Mechanism ǫ δ The resulting noise amounts The least noise amounts
Imtiaz and Sarwate [12] Dwork-2014 10 0.01 0.3108 0.3501
Liu et al. [13] Dwork-2014 6, 10 0.1 0.3746, 0.2248 0.3813, 0.2818
Wang et al. [14] Dwork-2014 8.87, 9.59 10−5 0.5462, 0.5052 0.5172, 0.5513
Ermis and Cemgil [15] Dwork-2014 10 10−2, 10−5 0.3108, 0.4845 0.3501, 0.4999
Liu et al. [16] Dwork-2014 8 10−1 0.2809 0.3215
Imtiaz and Sarwate [17] Dwork-2014 10 10−2 0.3108 0.3501
Ja¨lko¨ et al. [7] Dwork-2014 10 10−3 0.3776 0.4061
Heikkila¨ et al. [8] Dwork-2014 10, 31.62 10−4 0.4344, 0.1374 0.1976, 0.4553
Imtiaz and Sarwate [18] Dwork-2006 10 10−2 0.3325 0.3501
Pyrgelis et al. [19] Dwork-2006 10 10−1 0.2448 0.2818
Wang et al. [21] Dwork-2006 10 10−1 0.2448 0.2818
Jain and Thakurta [20] Dwork-2006 10 10−3 0.3898 0.4061
Remark 3. Results (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2 mean that
σDP-OPT is in the form of Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
for large ǫ (note 1ǫ is
smaller than 1√
ǫ
for large ǫ). This further implies the result of
Theorem 1 for 0 < δ ≤ 0.05 (our direct proof for Theorem 1
in Appendix B works for any 0 < δ < 1).
Remark 4. With r(u) := erfc (u)−eǫ erfc (√u2 + ǫ), the term
a in Eq. (5) satisfies r(a) = 2δ. Then r(u) strictly decreases
as u increases given the derivative r′(u) = 2√
π
exp(−u2) ×
u−√u2+ǫ√
u2+ǫ
< 0. Based on this and r(0) = 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ),
for a in Eq. (5), we obtain a > 0 if 2δ < 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ),
and a ≤ 0 otherwise. More discussions about Remark 4 are
presented in Appendix D of this supplementary file.
Remark 5. Mechanism DP-OPT is just the optimal Gaussian
mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy in the sense that it
gives the minimal required amount of noise when the noise
follows a Gaussian distribution. However, it may not be the
optimal mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, since there
may exist other perturbation methods [32], [35], [47] which
may outperform a Gaussian mechanism under certain utility
measure [33].
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix C of this supplementary
file.
Since σDP-OPT of Theorem 2 has no closed-form expression
and needs to be approximated in an iterative manner, we first
provide its asympotics in Theorem 3 and present more com-
putationally efficient upper bounds for σDP-OPT in Section V.
In Appendix O of this supplementary file, we present
Algorithm 1 to compute σDP-OPT of Theorem 2.
We now analyze the asympotics for the optimal Gaussian
noise amount σDP-OPT of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. As a side
result, we prove that σDP-OPT is always less than
∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ)
and hence bounded even for ǫ→ 0. This is in contrast to the
classical Gaussian mechanisms’ noise amounts σDwork-2006
and σDwork-2014 in Eq. (1) and (2) which scale with
1
ǫ and
hence tend to ∞ as ǫ→ 0.
Theorem 3 (An upper bound and asympotics of the optimal
Gaussian noise amount for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy).
① For any ǫ > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, σDP-OPT is less than
∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) , which is the optimal Gaussian noise amount
to achieve (0, δ)-differential privacy.
② Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, σDP-OPT converges to its upper
bound ∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) as ǫ→ 0.
③ Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, σDP-OPT is Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
as ǫ → ∞;
specifically, limǫ→∞ σDP-OPT
/(
∆√
2ǫ
)
= 1.
④ Given a fixed ǫ > 0, σDP-OPT is Θ
(√
ln 1δ
)
as δ → 0;
specifically, limδ→0 σDP-OPT
/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ
)
= 1.
Intuition of Result ① of Theorem 3 based on Theorem 2.
With δ fixed, when ǫ tends to 0, the quantity a in Eq. (5)
of Theorem 2 is negative and is close to − inverfc(1 − δ);
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DP Mechanisms Comparison Common properties
DP-OPT
of Theorem 2
• the optimal Gaussian mechanism to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP,
• no closed-form expression,
• computed using the bisection method
with the number of iterations being
logarithmic in the given error (i.e., tolerance).
Noise amounts σDP-OPT, σMechanism-1,
and σMechanism-2 are all smaller than
σDwork-2014 and σDwork-2006,
for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 which the proofs of
Dwork-2014 and Dwork-2006 require
(The proof is in Appendix A).Our Mechanism 1
of Theorem 4
• closed-form expression involving
the complementary error function
erfc() and its inverse inverfc(),
• computational complexity: dependent on
erfc() & inverfc() implementations and often very efficient,
• σMechanism-1 is slightly greater than σDP-OPT.
Our Mechanism 2
of Theorem 5
• closed-form expression involving
only elementary functions,
• computed in constant amount of time,
• σMechanism-2 is slightly greater than σMechanism-1.
i.e., inverf(δ), where we use erfc (−a) = 2 − erfc (a). Then
the numerator (a +
√
a2 + ǫ)∆ of Eq. (5) can be written as
ǫ∆
−a+√a2+ǫ and approaches
ǫ∆
(−a)·2 to scale with ǫ instead of
scaling with
√
ǫ as ǫ→ 0. As the numerator and denominator
of Eq. (5) are both Θ(ǫ) as ǫ→ 0, σDP-OPT with fixed δ does
not grow unboundedly as ǫ→ 0.
We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix E of this supplementary
file. Theorem 3 provides the first asymptotic results in the
literature on the optimal Gaussian noise amount for (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy. The proofs delicately bound σDP-OPT to
avoid over-approximation.
For clarification, we note that Results ② and ④ of The-
orem 3 do not contradict each other since Result ② fixes
0 < δ < 1 and considers ǫ → 0 so that ǫ/δ → 0, while
Result ④ fixes ǫ > 0 and considers δ → 0 so that δ/ǫ → 0.
More specifically, to bound σDP-OPT in Result ④, we consider
ǫ > f(δ) for some function f , which clearly holds given a
fixed ǫ > 0 and δ → 0. With ǫ > f(δ), the expression
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ in Result ④ is less than
∆
f(δ)
√
2 ln 1δ , which is
less than ∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) for suitable f(δ), so Result ② does not
contradict Result ④.
V. OUR PROPOSED GAUSSIAN MECHANISMS FOR
(ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Table II summarizes different mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy (DP), including DP-OPT in Theorem 2
of the previous section as well as our Mechanism 1 and
Mechanism 2 to be presented below.
We now detail our Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, where the noise amounts have
closed-form3 expressions and are more computationally
efficient than the above Theorem 2’s DP-OPT which has no
closed-form expression. Our idea is to present computationally
efficient upper bounds of σDP-OPT. To this end, we first present
Lemma 1, which upper bounds a in Eq. (5) of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. a in Eq. (5) is less than b in Eq. (7a).
3Closed-form expressions in this paper can include functions erf(), erfc(),
inverf(), and inverfc().
We prove Lemma 1 in Appendix G of this supplementary
file. Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 imply
σDP-OPT in Eq. (5) < σMechanism-1 in Eq. (7b) of Theorem 4,
(6)
where Theorem 4 below presents Mechanism 1 to achieve
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Theorem 4 (Gaussian Mechanism 1 for (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy). (ǫ, δ)-Differential privacy can be achieved by
Mechanism 1, which adds Gaussian noise with standard
deviation σMechanism-1 to each dimension of a query with ℓ2-
sensitivity ∆, for σMechanism-1 given by
b :=

inverfc
 2δ
1−eǫ·
erfc

√[
inverfc
(
2δ+eǫ erfc(
√
ǫ)
)]2
+ǫ

2δ+eǫ erfc(
√
ǫ)

if 2− eǫ erfc (√ǫ) > 2δ,
0 otherwise;
(7a)
σMechanism-1 :=
(b+
√
b2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (7b)
The expression of σMechanism-1 involves the complementary
error function erfc() and its inverse inverfc(). Hence, we fur-
ther present Lemma 2 below, which will enable us to propose
Mechanism 2. Its noise amount is given by the closed-form
expression of σMechanism-2 and has only elementary functions.
Lemma 2 upper bounds b in Eq. (7a) of Theorem 4.
Lemma 2. b in Eq. (7a) is less than c in Eq. (9).
We prove Lemma 2 in Appendix H of this supplementary
file. Theorem 4 and Lemma 2 imply
σMechanism-1 in Eq. (7b) < σMechanism-2 in Eq. (9), (8)
where the presented Mechanism 2 in Theorem 5 below is
further simpler than Mechanism 1 as noted above.
Theorem 5 (Gaussian Mechanism 2 for (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy). For 0 < δ < 0.5, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy can be
achieved by Mechanism 2, which adds Gaussian noise with
7SDP-OPT
DP-OPT
Dwork-2014
Dwork-2006
Mechanism 1
Mechanism 2
Mechanism 3
Mechanism 4
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
10
20
30
40
50
60
 = 0.1
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
2
3
4
5
6
 = 1
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
 = 5
(i) (ii) (iii)
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
0.4
0.5
0.6
 = 10
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
 = 15
10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
 = 20
(iv) (v) (vi)
Fig. 2: The noise amounts of different mechanisms with respect to δ, for ǫ = 0.1, 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20. The meanings of the
legends are as follows.
• pDP-OPT (resp., DP-OPT) is the optimal Gaussian mechanism to achieve (ǫ, δ)-pDP (resp., (ǫ, δ)-DP), where pDP is short
for probabilistic differential privacy, a notion stronger than differential privacy (DP) and to be elaborated in Section VI.
• Dwork-2006 (resp., Dwork-2014) is the Gaussian mechanism proposed by Dwork et al. [1] in 2006 (resp., Dwork and
Roth [2] in 2014) to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP.
• Mechanism 1 and Mechanism 2, which are our proposals to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP and discussed in Section V, are simpler
and more computationally efficient than DP-OPT.
• Mechanism 3 and Mechanism 4, which are our proposals to achieve (ǫ, δ)-pDP and will be discussed in Section VI-D,
are simpler and more computationally efficient than pDP-OPT.
standard deviation σMechanism-2 to each dimension of a query
with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for σMechanism-2 given by
c :=
√
ln 2√
16δ+1−1 ; σMechanism-2 :=
(c+
√
c2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (9)
Superiority of our mechanisms. The following discussions
show the superiority of our proposed mechanisms.
i) From Inequalities (6) and (8), we have
σDP-OPT in Eq. (5) < σMechanism-1 in Eq. (7b) <
σMechanism-2 in Eq. (9). Among these noise amounts,
σMechanism-1 and σMechanism-2 are straightforward to
compute, whereas σDP-OPT require higher computational
complexity (a simple approach is the bisection method
in [48, Page 3]. Also, our plots in Figure 2 show
that the noise amounts added by the optimal Gaussian
mechanism DP-OPT and our more computationally
efficient Mechanism 1 are close.
ii) For 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 where the proofs of Dwork-2006 of [1]
and Dwork-2014 of [2] require, we prove in Appendix A
that
σMechanism-1 < σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014 < σDwork-2006.
(10)
iii) From Theorem 1, there exists a function G(δ) such
that Dwork-2014 does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy for ǫ > G(δ). Figure 1 shows G(10−3) = 7.47,
G(10−4) = 8.00, G(10−5) = 8.43, and G(10−6) =
8.79. Result ii) above considers 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. For
1 < ǫ ≤ G(δ) which the proof of Dwork-2014 does
not cover but Dwork-2014 happens to achieve (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, σMechanism-1 < σDwork-2014 still holds
as given by Figure 2. Moreover, our Mechanism 1 and
Mechanism 2 apply to any ǫ. A similar discussion holds
for Dwork-2006.
Applications of our mechanisms. Our proposed mechanisms
has the following applications. First, the noise amounts of our
mechanisms can be set as initial values to quickly search
for the optimal value or its tighter upper bound (as the
optimal value has no closed-form expression). We use such
approach in Algorithm 1 of Appendix O of this supplementary
file. In addition, our upper bounds may provide an intuitive
understanding about how a sufficient Gaussian noise amount
changes according to ǫ and δ: given δ, a noise amount of
Θ
(
1
ǫ
)
+ Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
suffices; i.e., Θ
(
1
ǫ
)
suffices for small ǫ and
Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
suffices for large ǫ. Finally, our mechanisms can
be useful for Internet of Things (IoT) devices with little
power or computational capabilities, since our mechanisms
are more computationally efficient than the optimal Gaussian
mechanism.
VI. (ǫ, δ)-PROBABILISTIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY:
CONNECTION TO (ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND
GAUSSIAN MECHANISMS
In this section, for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy,
we discuss its connection to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and its
Gaussian mechanisms.
A. (ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic differential privacy
To achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (formally given in
Definition 1 on Page 4), most mechanisms ensure a condition
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Fig. 3: The shaded area in each subfigure represents the set of
(ǫ, δ) where Mechanism Dwork-2014 (resp., Dwork-2006)
does not achieve (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
on the privacy loss random variable defined below. Such
condition is termed (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy [40]
and elaborated below. We will explain that (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy is sufficient but not necessary for (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
For neighboring datasets D and D′, the privacy loss
LY,D,D′(y) represents the multiplicative difference between
the probabilities that the same output y is observed when the
randomized algorithm Y is applied to D and D′, respectively.
Specifically, we define
LY,D,D′(y) := ln
F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
, (11)
where F [·] denotes the probability density function.
For simplicity, we use probability density function F [·] in
Eq. (11) above by assuming that the randomized algorithm Y
has continuous output. If Y has discrete output, we replace
F [·] by probability notation P [·].
When y follows the probability distribution of random vari-
able Y (D), LY,D,D′(y) follows the probability distribution of
LY,D,D′(Y (D)), which is the privacy loss random variable.
As a sufficient condition to enforce (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy,
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy of [40] is defined such
that the privacy loss random variable LY,D,D′(Y (D)) falls
in the interval [−ǫ, ǫ] with probability at least 1 − δ; i.e.,
P [−ǫ ≤ LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1 − δ. This is equivalent to
the following definition.
Definition 2 ((ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic differential privacy [40]).
A randomized algorithm Y satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differ-
ential privacy, if for any two neighboring datasets D and
D′ (elaborated in Remark 1 on Page 4), we have that for
y following the probabilistic distribution of the output Y (D)
(notated as y ∼ Y (D)),
Py∼Y (D)
[
e−ǫ ≤ F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
≤ eǫ
]
≥ 1− δ, (12)
where F [·] denotes the probability density function.
B. Relationships between differential privacy and probabilistic
differential privacy
Lemmas 3 and 4 below present the relationships between
differential privacy and probabilistic differential privacy.
Lemma 3. (ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic differential privacy implies
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Lemma 4. (ǫ, δ)-Differential privacy implies (ǫ∗,
δ·(1+e−ǫ∗ )
1−eǫ−ǫ∗ )-
probabilistic differential privacy for any ǫ∗ > ǫ.
While the straightforward Lemma 3 is shown in [2], the
proof of Lemma 4 is not trivial. Although [9] of Dwork
and Rothblum, and [10] of Bun and Steinke mention that
differential privacy is equivalent, up to a small loss in pa-
rameters, to probabilistic differential privacy, [9], [10] do not
present Lemma 4. For completeness, we present the proofs of
Lemmas 3 and 4 in Appendices I and J of this supplementary
file.
Similar to Theorem 1 on Page 4, we show in Figure 3 the
failures of the classical Gaussian mechanisms of Dwork and
Roth [2] in 2014 and of Dwork et al. [1] in 2006 to achieve
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for large ǫ.
We now present the optimal Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy.
C. An analytical but not closed-form expression for the op-
timal Gaussian mechanism of (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy
The optimal Gaussian mechanism of (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy (pDP) is given in Theorem 6 below.
Theorem 6 (Optimal Gaussian mechanism for
(ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy). The optimal
Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy, denoted by Mechanism pDP-OPT, adds Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σpDP-OPT to each dimension of
a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for σpDP-OPT given by
Solve d such that erfc (d) + erfc
(√
d2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ;(13a)
σpDP-OPT :=
(
d+
√
d2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (13b)
Remark 6. Mechanism pDP-OPT is just the optimal
Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential pri-
vacy in the sense that it gives the minimal required amount
of noise when the noise follows a Gaussian distribution.
However, it may not be the optimal mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy, since there may exist other
perturbation methods (e.g., adding non-Gaussian noise) which
may outperform a Gaussian mechanism under certain utility
measure [47].
We prove Theorem 6 in Appendix K of this supplementary
file. We present the asympotics of σpDP-OPT as Theorem 7
below.
Theorem 7 (The asympotics of the optimal Gaussian noise
amount for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy).
① Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, σpDP-OPT is Θ
(
1
ǫ
)
as ǫ→ 0. Specifically, given a fixed 0 < δ < 1,
limǫ→0 σpDP-OPT
/(
inverfc(δ)·∆
ǫ
√
2
)
= 1.
9TABLE III: Different mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (pDP).
pDP Mechanisms Comparison
Our pDP-OPT
of Theorem 6
• the optimal Gaussian mechanism to achieve (ǫ, δ)-pDP,
• no closed-form expression,
• computed using the bisection method with the number of iterations
being logarithmic in the given error (i.e., tolerance).
Our Mechanism 3
of Theorem 8
• closed-form expression involving
the complementary error function’s inverse inverfc(),
• computational complexity: dependent on
inverfc() implementations and often very efficient,
• σMechanism-3 is slightly greater than σpDP-OPT.
Our Mechanism 4
of Theorem 9
• closed-form expression involving only elementary functions,
• computed in constant amount of time,
• σMechanism-4 is slightly greater than σMechanism-3.
② Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, σpDP-OPT is Θ
(
1√
ǫ
)
as ǫ→∞. Specifically, given a fixed 0 < δ < 1,
limǫ→∞ σpDP-OPT
/(
∆√
2ǫ
)
= 1.
③ Given a fixed ǫ > 0, σpDP-OPT is Θ
(√
ln 1δ
)
as δ → 0. Specifically, given a fixed ǫ > 0,
limδ→0 σpDP-OPT
/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ
)
= 1.
Theorem 7 is proved in Appendix L of this supplementary
file.
Remark 7. From Result ① of Theorem 7, given a fixed
0 < δ < 1, σpDP-OPT = Θ
(
1
ǫ
) → ∞ as ǫ→ 0. In contrast,
from Result ① of Theorem 3, given a fixed 0 < δ < 1,
σDP-OPT → ∆2√2·inverf(δ) as ǫ→ 0. This shows a fundamen-
tal difference between (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy.
Remark 8. In Lemmas 3 and 4 above, we show the relation-
ship between differential privacy and probabilistic differential
privacy that the latter implies the former and the former
implies the latter up to possible loss in privacy parameters.
Given this, one may wonder if this relationship contradicts
their difference discussed in Remark 7 above as ǫ→ 0. Below
we explain there is no contradiction, by showing that the
Gaussian noise amount for probabilistic differential privacy
obtained by first achieving differential privacy is at the same
order as the optimal Gaussian noise amount for probabilistic
differential privacy when ǫ→ 0.
From Lemma 4, (0, δ·(1−e
−ǫ)
1+e−ǫ )-differential privacy im-
plies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. From Result ①
of Theorem 3, (0, δ·(1−e
−ǫ)
1+e−ǫ )-differential privacy can be
achieved by the Gaussian mechanism with noise amount
∆
2
√
2·inverf
(
δ·(1−e−ǫ)
1+e−ǫ
) . Hence, (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy can also be achieved by the Gaussian mechanism with
noise amount ∆
2
√
2·inverf
(
δ·(1−e−ǫ)
1+e−ǫ
) , which given δ is Θ ( 1ǫ ) as
ǫ→ 0 due to limǫ→0 (1−e
−ǫ)
1+e−ǫ
/
ǫ = 12 and limx→0
inverf(x)
x =√
π
2 from [49]. From Result ① of Theorem 7, the optimal Gaus-
sian noise amount for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
given δ is also Θ
(
1
ǫ
)
as ǫ→ 0. Hence, the combination of
Lemma 4 and Result ① of Theorem 3 does not contradict
Result ① of Theorem 7.
From Theorem 6, the optimal Gaussian mechanism
pDP-OPT does not have a closed-form expression. In the next
subsection, we detail our Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-pDP,
where the noise amounts have closed-form expressions and are
more computationally efficient than pDP-OPT.
D. Our Gaussian mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differen-
tial privacy with closed-form expressions of noise amounts
The idea of our Gaussian mechanisms is to present compu-
tationally efficient upper bounds of σpDP-OPT. To this end, we
first present Lemma 5, which upper bounds d in Eq. (13a) of
Theorem 6.
Lemma 5. d in Eq. (13a) is greater than inverfc(2δ) and less
than inverfc(δ).
We prove Lemma 5 in Appendix M of this supplementary
file. Theorem 6 and Lemma 5 imply an upper bound of
σpDP-OPT as σMechanism-3 in Theorem 8 below, where we
present Mechanism 3 to achieve (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differ-
ential privacy.
Theorem 8 (Gaussian Mechanism 3 for
(ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic differential privacy). (ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic
differential privacy can be achieved by Mechanism 3, which
adds Gaussian noise with standard deviation σMechanism-3
to each dimension of a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for
σMechanism-3 given by
f := inverfc(δ); (14a)
σMechanism-3 :=
(
f +
√
f2 + ǫ
)
·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (14b)
The expression of σMechanism-3 involves the complementary
error function’s inverse inverfc(). Hence, we further present
Lemma 6 below, which will enable us to propose Mechanism
4. Its noise amount is given by the closed-form expression of
σMechanism-4 and has only elementary functions.
Lemma 6 upper bounds f in Eq. (14a).
Lemma 6. f in Eq. (14a) is less than g in Eq. (15a).
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We prove Lemma 6 in Appendix N of this supplementary
file.
Theorem 8 and Lemma 6 imply an upper bound of
σMechanism-3 as σMechanism-4 in Theorem 9 below, where
the presented Mechanism 4 is further simpler than
Mechanism 3 as noted above.
Theorem 9 (Gaussian Mechanism 4 for
(ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic differential privacy). (ǫ, δ)-Probabilistic
differential privacy can be achieved by Mechanism 4, which
adds Gaussian noise with standard deviation σMechanism-4
to each dimension of a query with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for
σMechanism-4 given by
g :=
√
ln
2√
8δ + 1− 1 ; (15a)
σMechanism-4 :=
(
g +
√
g2 + ǫ
)
·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (15b)
Table III summarizes different mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy discussed above.
VII. CONCENTRATED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND
RELATED NOTIONS
Several variants of differential privacy (DP), including
mean-concentrated differential privacy (mCDP) [9], zero-
concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) [10], Re´nyi differen-
tial privacy [23] (RDP), and truncated concentrated differential
privacy (tCDP) [24] have been recently proposed as alterna-
tives to (ǫ, δ)-DP. Below we show that achieving (ǫ, δ)-DP by
first ensuring one of these privacy definitions (mCDP, zCDP,
RDP, and tCDP) cannot give Gaussian mechanisms better than
ours, based on existing results on the relationships between
mCDP, zCDP, RDP, tCDP and DP.
Lemma 7 (Relationship between (ǫ, δ)-DP and
(µ, τ)-mCDP). For ǫ > µ, (µ, τ)-mCDP implies (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy (pDP) for
δ = exp
(
− (ǫ−µ)22τ2
)
+ exp
(
− (ǫ+µ)22τ2
)
, which further implies
(ǫ, δ)-DP.
Despite not being presented in [9] which proposes mCDP,
the first part of Lemma 7 clearly follows from the definitions
of mCDP and pDP by using the tail bounds on the privacy loss
random variable of mCDP, while the second part of Lemma 7
is from Lemma 3.
For a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1, Theorem 3.2 in [9]
shows that the Gaussian mechanism with standard deviation σ
achieves ( 12σ2 ,
1
σ )-mCDP, which based on Lemma 7 implies
(ǫ, δ)-pDP for δ = exp
(
− (ǫ−
1
2σ2
)2
2( 1
σ
)2
)
+ exp
(
− (ǫ+
1
2σ2
)2
2( 1
σ
)2
)
.
Expressing σ in terms of ǫ and δ gives σ as σpDP-OPT of
Theorem 6. Hence, using the relationship between mCDP and
(p)DP does not give a new mechanism which we have not
presented.
Relationship between zCDP and DP. From Proposition
1.3 and Proposition 1.6 in [10], ρ-zCDP implies (ǫ, δ)-DP
for ǫ = ρ + 2
√
ρ ln(1δ ). Moreover, the Gaussian mechanism
with standard deviation σ achieves ρ-zCDP by [10], where
ρ = ∆
2
2σ2 . Combining these results, we can derive that the Gaus-
sian mechanism with standard deviation
∆·
(√
ln 1
δ
+
√
ln 1
δ
+ǫ
)
√
2ǫ
achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP. This expression is obtained by solving
σ which satisfy ρ = ∆
2
2σ2 and ǫ = ρ + 2
√
ρ ln(1δ ). Such
noise amount is even worse (i.e., higher) than our weak-
est Mechanism 4 in Theorem 9 on Page 10 in view of√
8δ + 1 − 1 > 2δ given 0 < δ < 1. Hence, achieving (ǫ, δ)-
DP by first ensuring zCDP cannot give Gaussian mechanisms
better than ours.
Relationship between RDP and DP. Mironov [23] shows
that (α, ρα)-RDP implies (ǫ, δ)-DP for ǫ = ρα+ ln(1/δ)α−1 , and
the Gaussian mechanism with standard deviation σ achieves
(α, ρα)-RDP for ρ = ∆
2
2σ2 . Combining these results, we can
also prove that the Gaussian mechanism with standard devia-
tion
∆·
(√
ln 1
δ
+
√
ln 1
δ
+ǫ
)
√
2 ǫ
achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP. This expression
is obtained by finding the smallest σ such that there exists
α > 1 such that ρ = ∆
2
2σ2 and ǫ = ρα +
ln(1/δ)
α−1 (we just
express σ and take its minimum with respect to α). As noted
above, this noise amount is even worse (i.e., higher) than our
weakest Mechanism 4 in Theorem 9. Thus, achieving (ǫ, δ)-
DP by first ensuring RDP cannot give Gaussian mechanisms
better than ours. We emphasize that the comparison may be
different if the RDP paper [23]’s Proposition 3 that (α, ρα)-
RDP implies (ρα + ln(1/δ)α−1 , δ)-DP can be improved. Yet, we
have not been able to find such improvement after checking
prior papers related to RDP.
Relationship between tCDP and DP. Bun et al. [24]
show that (ρ, ω)-tCDP implies (ǫ, δ)-DP for ǫ =ρ+ 2
√
ρ ln 1δ if ln
1
δ ≤ (ω − 1)2ρ,
ρω +
ln( 1
δ
)
ω−1 if ln
1
δ ≥ (ω − 1)2ρ,
and the Gaussian
mechanism with standard deviation σ achieves (ρ, ω)-tCDP
for ρ = ∆
2
2σ2 . We can see that these results are already
covered by the above discussions for the relationship between
zCDP and DP, and for the relationship between RDP and DP.
Therefore, achieving (ǫ, δ)-DP by first ensuring tCDP cannot
give Gaussian mechanisms better than ours.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents experiments to evaluate different
Gaussian mechanisms for mean estimation and histogram
estimation under differential privacy.
A. Mean Estimation
We evaluate the utility of all mechanisms for the task of
private mean estimation using synthetic data. The input dataset
x = (x1, . . . , xn) contains n vectors xi ∈ Rd for a given d,
and the query for mean computation is Q(x) = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 xi.
We set n = 1000 and sample each dataset x in two steps [39].
The first step is to sample an initial data center x0 ∈ Rd,
with each dimension of x0 independently following a standard
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance being
1. The second step is to construct x = (x1, . . . , xn) with
xi = x0 + ξi, where each ξi ∈ Rd is independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with independent coordinates
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Fig. 4: Mean estimation.
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Fig. 5: Histogram estimation.
sampled uniformly from the interval [−1/2, 1/2]. We consider
bounded differential privacy, where two neighboring datasets
have the same size n, and have different records at only one
of the n positions. Since the points xi in each dataset all lie in
an ℓ∞-ball of radius 1, the ℓ2-sensitivity of mean estimation
is
√
d/n, where d is a record’s dimension.
For the above query Q on the dataset x, we consider
different Gaussian mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy. Let Q˜ be such a Gaussian mechanism. We report the
ℓ2 error
∥∥∥Q˜(x) −Q(x)∥∥∥
2
. The results for different Gaussian
mechanisms are presented in Figure 4. The plots consider
ǫ ≤ 1 since this is required by the proofs of Dwork-2006
of [1] and Dwork-2014 of [2]. Figure 4-(a) fixes δ = 10−4
and varies ǫ; Figure 4-(b) fixes ǫ = 0.1 and varies δ; and
Figure 4-(c) with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 10−4 evaluates the
impact of a data record’s dimension d. All subfigures of
Figure 4 show that our proposed Gaussian mechanisms achieve
better utilities than the classical Gaussian mechanisms [1],
[2] Dwork-2014 and Dwork-2006; In fact, Dwork-2014
and Dwork-2006 have the largest ℓ2-errors. Moreover, the
utilities of our proposed mechanisms are close to that of
the optimal yet more computationally expensive Gaussian
mechanism DP-OPT.
B. Histogram Estimation
We now run experiments on the Adult dataset from the UCI
machine learning repository4, to evaluate different Gaussian
mechanisms for histogram estimation with differential privacy.
The Adult dataset contains census information with 45222
records and 15 attributes. The attributes include both categor-
ical ones such as race, gender, and education level, as well as
numerical ones such as capital gain, capital loss, and weight.
We consider the combination of all categorical attributes and
let the histogram query be a vector of the counts. Here we
tackle unbounded differential privacy, where a neighboring
dataset is obtained by deleting or adding one record, so the
sensitivity of the histogram query is 1. For different Gaussian
mechanisms satisfying (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we compare
their Mean Squared Error (MSE) and plot the results in
Figure 5.
In Figure 5-(a), we vary ǫ from 0.1 to 1.0 while fixing
δ = 10−6. In Figure 5-(b), we vary δ from 10−9 to 10−5
4http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml
while fixing ǫ = 0.1. Both subfigures show that the utilities of
our proposed Gaussian mechanisms are higher than those of
the classical ones [1], [2] and close to that of the optimal yet
more computationally expensive DP-OPT mechanism.
IX. CONCLUSION
Differential privacy (DP) has received considerable interest
recently since it provides a rigorous framework to quan-
tify data privacy. Well-known solutions to (ǫ, δ)-DP are the
Gaussian mechanisms by Dwork et al. [1] in 2006 and by
Dwork and Roth [2] in 2014, where a certain amount of
Gaussian noise is added independently to each dimension
of the query result. Although the two classical Gaussian
mechanisms [1], [2] explicitly state their usage for ǫ ≤ 1
only, many studies applying them neglect the constraint on
ǫ, rendering the obtained results inaccurate. In this paper, for
(ǫ, δ)-DP, we present Gaussian mechanisms which work for
every ǫ. Another improvement is that our mechanisms achieve
higher utilities than those of the classical ones [1], [2]. Since
most mechanisms proposed in the literature for (ǫ, δ)-DP are
obtained by ensuring a condition called (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic
differential privacy (pDP), we also present the difference/re-
lationship between (ǫ, δ)-DP and (ǫ, δ)-pDP, and Gaussian
mechanisms for (ǫ, δ)-pDP. Our research on reviewing and
improving the Gaussian mechanisms will benefit differential
privacy applications built based on the primitive.
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APPENDIX
The appendices are organized as follows. Appendices A
and B are also provided in the submission, while other
appendices are given in this submitted supplementary file (the
same as [50]).
• Appendix A presents the proof of
σMechanism-1 < σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014 < σDwork-2006.
• Appendix B presents the proof of Theorem 1.
• Appendix C presents the proof of Theorem 2.
• Appendix D presents more discussions about Remark 4 of
Page 5.
• Appendix E presents the proof of Theorem 3.
• Appendix F presents the proof of Lemma 10.
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• Appendix G proves Lemma 1, which along with Theorem 2
implies Theorem 4.
• Appendix H proves Lemma 2, which along with Theorem 4
implies Theorem 5.
• Appendix I presents the proof of Lemma 3.
• Appendix J presents the proof of Lemma 4.
• Appendix K presents the proof of Theorem 6.
• Appendix L presents the proof of Theorem 7.
• Appendix M proves Lemma 5, which along with Theorem 6
implies Theorem 8.
• Appendix N proves Lemma 6, which along with Theorem 8
implies Theorem 9.
• Appendix O presents Algorithm 1 to compute σDP-OPT of
Theorem 2.
• Appendix P provides analyses for the composition of
Gaussian mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP or (ǫ, δ)-pDP.
• Appendix Q shows Lemma 8, which is used in the proofs
of Lemmas 2 and 6.
A. Proving σMechanism-1 < σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014 <
σDwork-2006
To prove σMechanism-1 < σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014 <
σDwork-2006, from Inequalities (3) and (8), we just need
to establish σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014. Recalling Eq. (2)
and (9), we will prove√
2 ln
1.25
δ
>
(√
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1 + ǫ +
√
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1
)/√
2,
for ǫ ≤ 1 and 0 < δ < 0.5. (16)
Since the term after “>” in Inequality (16) is increasing
with respect to ǫ, we can just let ǫ be 1 in Inequality (16).
Hence, we will obtain Inequality (16) once proving√
2 ln
1.25
δ
>
(√
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1 + 1 +
√
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1
)/√
2,
for 0 < δ < 0.5. (17)
With a denoting
√
ln 1.25δ and b denoting
√
ln 2√
16δ+1−1 , then
Inequality (17) means
√
2 a > (
√
b2 + 1+
√
b )/
√
2, which is
equivalent to b < a− 0.25a since setting b as a− 0.25a will let
(
√
b2 + 1+
√
b )/
√
2 be
√
2 a exactly (note that a− 0.25a > 0
clearly holds for 0 < δ < 0.5). Hence, the desired result
Inequality (17) is equivalent to√
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1 <
√
ln
1.25
δ
− 0.25√
ln 1.25δ
,
for 0 < δ < 0.5, (18)
which clearly is implied by the following after taking the
square on both sides:
ln
2√
16δ + 1− 1 < ln
1.25
δ
− 0.5, for 0 < δ < 0.5. (19)
Due to 1.25× exp(−0.5) ≈ 0.7582 > 0.75, Inequality (19) is
implied by
2√
16δ + 1− 1 <
0.75
δ
for 0 < δ < 0.5. (20)
We define f(δ) := 2√
16δ+1−1 − 0.75δ . Taking the derivative of
f(δ) with respect to δ, we obtain
f ′(δ) = − 16
(
√
16δ + 1− 1)2√16δ + 1 +
3
4δ2
=
5
√
16δ + 1− (8δ + 1)
8δ2
√
16δ + 1
=
25(16δ + 1)− (8δ + 1)2
8[5
√
16δ + 1 + (8δ + 1)]δ2
√
16δ + 1
=
64δ(1− δ) + 320δ + 24
8[5
√
16δ + 1 + (8δ + 1)]δ2
√
16δ + 1
> 0, for 0 < δ < 0.5. (21)
Hence, f(δ) is strictly increasing for 0 < δ < 0.5, resulting
in f(δ) < f(0.5) = 2√
16δ+1−1 − 0.75δ = −0.5 < 0, so
that Inequality (20) is proved. Then following the explanation
above, we complete establishing σMechanism-2 < σDwork-2014.

B. Proof of Theorem 1
From Theorem 2, σDP-OPT is the minimal required amount
of Gaussian noise to achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Hence,
to show that the Gaussian noise amount F (δ) × ∆/ǫ is not
sufficient for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we will prove that for
any 0 < δ < 1, there exists a positive function G(δ) such that
for any ǫ > G(δ), we have
F (δ)×∆/ǫ < σDP-OPT. (22)
We can show that the function x+
√
x2 + ǫ strictly increases
as x increases for x ∈ (−∞,∞) by noting its derivative
1 + x√
x2+ǫ
is positive. Also, limx→−∞(x +
√
x2 + ǫ) =
limx→−∞ ǫ−x+√x2+ǫ = 0 and limx→∞(x +
√
x2 + ǫ) = ∞.
Hence, the values that x+
√
x2 + ǫ for x ∈ (−∞,∞) can take
constitutes the open interval (0,∞). Then due to F (δ) > 0,
we can define h such that
F (δ) =
h+
√
h2 + ǫ√
2
. (23)
From Eq. (23) and σDP-OPT =
(a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
of (5), clearly
Inequality (22) is equivalent to h+
√
h2+ǫ√
2
< a+
√
a2+ǫ√
2
and
further equivalent to h < a.
As shown in Appendix D,
r(u) := erfc (u)− eǫ erfc (√u2 + ǫ) strictly decreases as
u increases for u ∈ (−∞,∞). Then h < a is equivalent to
r(h) > r(a). We will prove limǫ→∞ r(h) = 2, which along
with r(a) = 2δ in Eq. (5) implies that for any 0 < δ < 1,
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there exists a positive function G(δ) such that for any
ǫ > G(δ), we have r(h) > r(a) and thus h < a.
From the above discussion, the desired result Eq. (22)
follows once we show limǫ→∞ r(h) = 2. From Eq. (23), it
holds that h = F (δ)√
2
− ǫ
F (δ)·2√2 . Hence, for any ǫ ≥ 4×[F (δ)]2,
we have h ≤ − ǫ
4
√
2·F (δ) , which implies
eǫ erfc
(√
h2 + ǫ
)
≤ eǫ erfc (|h|)
≤ eǫ erfc
(
ǫ
4
√
2 · F (δ)
)
≤ eǫ × exp
(
−
(
ǫ
4
√
2 · F (δ)
)2)
→ 0, as ǫ→∞, (24)
where the last “≤” uses erfc (x) ≤ exp (−x2) for x > 0. The
above result Eq. (24) implies limǫ→∞[eǫ erfc
(√
h2 + ǫ
)
] =
0. Combining this and limǫ→∞ erfc (h) = 2, we derive
limǫ→∞ r(h) = 2. Then as already explained, the desired
result is proved. 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proving Theorem 2’s Property (i):
The optimal Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy, denoted by Mechanism DP-OPT, adds Gaussian noise
with standard deviation σDP-OPT to each dimension of a query
with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆, for σDP-OPT obtained by Theorem 8 of
Balle and Wang [22] to satisfy
Φ
(
∆
2σDP-OPT
− ǫσDP-OPT
∆
)
− eǫΦ
(
− ∆
2σDP-OPT
− ǫσDP-OPT
∆
)
= δ, (25)
where Φ (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of
the standard univariate Gaussian probability distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1.
We define
a :=
1√
2
(ǫσDP-OPT
∆
− ∆
2σDP-OPT
)
. (26)
Then σDP-OPT equals
(a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
, as given by Eq. (5).
Also, 1√
2
(− ∆2σDP-OPT − ǫσDP-OPT∆ ) in Eq. (25) equals −√a2 + ǫ,
since 12
(
− ∆2σDP-OPT −
ǫσDP-OPT
∆
)2
− 12
(
ǫσDP-OPT
∆ − ∆2σDP-OPT
)2
= ǫ.
Thus, Eq. (25) becomes
Φ
(
−a
√
2
)
− eǫΦ
(
−
√
2(a2 + ǫ)
)
= δ. (27)
Given
Φ
(
−a
√
2
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf (−a)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf (a)
=
1
2
erfc (a) (28)
and
Φ
(
−
√
2(a2 + ǫ)
)
=
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
−
√
a2 + ǫ
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
=
1
2
erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
. (29)
Then we write Eq. (25) as
1
2 erfc (a)− eǫ · 12 erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
= δ, so a is given by
Eq. (5).
Proving Theorem 2’s Property (ii):
For ǫ ≥ 0.01 and 0 < δ ≤ 0.05, we know from Appendix D
to be presented soon that 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ) > 2δ and a >
0. Using this in σDP-OPT :=
(a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
, we clearly have
σDP-OPT >
∆√
2ǫ
.
Proving Theorem 2’s Property (iii):
From Theorem 2’s Property (ii) proved above, a > 0. Given
erfc (a)− eǫ erfc (√a2 + ǫ) = 2δ, we use erfc (a) > 2δ to
derive a < inverfc(2δ) <
√
ln 12δ , where the last step uses
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0 < δ ≤ 0.05 and Proposition 1 below. Then we have
σDP-OPT : =
(
a+
√
a2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
<
(
a+
√
(a+
√
ǫ)2
)
·∆
ǫ
√
2
=
(2a+
√
ǫ ) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
<
√
2 ln
1
2δ
· ∆
ǫ
+
∆√
2ǫ
(30)

Proposition 1. inverfc(x) <
√
ln 1x for 0 < x < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. The desired result inverfc(x) <√
ln 1x follows from Lemma 8 (i.e., inverfc(x) <√
ln 2√
8x+1−1 for 0 < x < 1) and the obvious inequality√
8x+ 1− 1 > 2x for 0 < x < 1. 
Lemma 8. For 0 < y < 1, it holds that inverfc(y) <√
ln 2√
8y+1−1 .
We defer the proof of Lemma 8 to the end (i.e., Ap-
pendix Q).
D. More discussions about Remark 4 of Page 5
With r(u) := erfc (u) − eǫ erfc (√u2 + ǫ), the term a
in Eq. (5) satisfies r(a) = 2δ. We know that r(u) strictly
decreases as u increases for u ∈ (−∞,∞) in view of the
derivative r′(u) = 2√
π
exp(−u2) · u−
√
u2+ǫ√
u2+ǫ
< 0. Moreover,
we now show r(0) = 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ) > 0. With s(ǫ) :=
eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ), we know from Lemma 9 below that s(ǫ) strictly
decreases as ǫ increases for ǫ > 0. The above analysis induces
r(0) = 1− s(ǫ) > 1− s(0) = 0.
Summarizing the above results, r(a) = 2δ,
r(0) = 1− eǫ erfc (√ǫ) > 0, we define ǫ∗ as the solution to
1 − eǫ∗ erfc (√ǫ∗) = 2δ (ǫ∗ exists for 0 < δ < 0.5 from
Lemma 9 below), and have the following results for a in
Eq. (5), where “iff” is short for “if and only if”:
1) a>0 iff 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)>2δ (i.e., iff ǫ>ǫ∗ when ǫ∗ exists);
2) a=0 iff 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)=2δ (i.e., iff ǫ= ǫ∗ when ǫ∗ exists);
3) a<0 iff 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)<2δ (i.e., iff ǫ<ǫ∗ when ǫ∗ exists).
In most real-world applications with ǫ ≥ 0.01 and δ ≤ 0.05,
case 1) above holds since 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ) = 1 − s(ǫ) ≥ 1 −
s(0.01) > 0.1 ≥ 2δ, where we use the above result that s(ǫ)
strictly decreases as ǫ increases.
Lemma 9. The following results hold.
i) With s(ǫ) := eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ), s(ǫ) strictly decreases as ǫ
increases for ǫ > 0.
ii) The values that s(ǫ) for ǫ ∈ (0,∞) can take constitutes
the open interval (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 9:
Proving Result i): We obtain the desired result in view of
the derivative s′(ǫ) := − 1√
πǫ
+ eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) < 0, where the
last step holds from erfc (
√
ǫ) < exp(−ǫ)√
πǫ
, which we obtain
by replacing x with
√
ǫ in Reference [51]’s Inequality (4):
erfc (x) < exp(−x
2)
x
√
π
.
Proving Result ii): From erfc (
√
ǫ) < exp(−ǫ)√
πǫ
given above,
we have s(ǫ) = eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) < 1√
πǫ
→ 0 as ǫ → ∞. Also,
s(0) = 1. Since we know from Result i) that s(ǫ) strictly
decreases as ǫ increases for ǫ > 0, the values that s(ǫ) for
ǫ ∈ (0,∞) can take constitutes the open interval (0, 1).
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first present Lemma 10, which is proved in Appendix F
below.
Lemma 10 (Bounds of the optimal Gaussian noise amount
for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy). Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, we
have:
For ǫ> 0: σDP-OPT<
∆
2
√
2·inverfc(1−δ) =
∆
2
√
2·inverf(δ) ; (31a)
For ǫ> 0: σDP-OPT<
(
inverfc(2δ)+
√
[inverfc(2δ)]2+ǫ
)
·∆
ǫ
√
2
. (31b)
If 0 < δ < 0.5, with ǫ∗ denoting the solution to
eǫ∗ erfc
(√
ǫ∗
)
= 1− 2δ, we have:
For 0<ǫ≤ǫ∗:σDP-OPT> ∆√
2{inverfc( 2−2δ
eǫ+1 )+
√
[inverfc( 2−2δ
eǫ+1 )]
2+ǫ}
;(32a)
For ǫ > ǫ∗: σDP-OPT > ∆√2ǫ . (32b)
If 0.5 ≤ δ < 1 (which does not hold in practice and is
presented here only for completeness), with ǫ# denoting the
solution to eǫ# erfc
(√
ǫ#
)
= 1− δ, we have:
For ǫ > 0:σDP-OPT>
∆√
2{inverfc( 2−2δ
eǫ+1 )+
√
[inverfc( 2−2δ
eǫ+1 )]
2+ǫ}
;(33a)
For ǫ > ǫ#: σDP-OPT >
∆(
inverf(δ)+
√
[inverf(δ)]2+ǫ
)
·√2
. (33b)
We prove Lemma 10 in Appendix F. Below we use
Lemma 10 to show Theorem 3.
Eq. (31a) is Result ① of Theorem 3. Eq. (31a) (32a)
and (33a) imply Result ② of Theorem 3. If 0 < δ < 0.5,
Eq. (31b) and (32b) imply Result ③ of Theorem 3. If 0.5 ≤
δ < 1, Eq. (31b) and (33b) imply Result ③ of Theorem 3.
To prove Result ④ of Theorem 3 (i.e.,
limδ→0 σDP-OPT
/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ
)
= 1), below we use the
sandwich method. Specifically, we find an upper bound and a
lower bound for σDP-OPT, and show that dividing each bound
by ∆ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ converges to 1 as δ → 0.
For the upper bound part, given a fixed ǫ > 0, we use
Theorem 2’s Property (iii) to derive
σDP-OPT
/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln
1
δ
)
<
(√
2 ln
1
2δ
· ∆
ǫ
+
∆√
2ǫ
)/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln
1
δ
)
→ 1, as δ → 0. (34)
The proof for the lower bound part is more complex and is
presented below.
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We define f(x) = ex erfc
(√
a2 + x
)
. Then we have the
first-order derivative f ′(x) and second-order derivative f ′′(x)
as follows:
f ′(x) = ex erfc
(√
a2 + x
)
− exp(−a
2)√
π(a2 + x)
and
f ′′(x) = ex erfc
(√
a2 + x
)
− exp(−a
2)√
π(a2 + x)
+
exp(−a2)
2
√
π(a2 + x)3/2
.
We have the following two propositions. After stating their
proofs, we continue proving Theorem 2.
Proposition 2. f ′(x) < 0 for x ≥ 0.
Proposition 3. f ′′(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition 3, we have
f ′(x) ≤ f ′(0) for x ≥ 0, which along with
f ′(0) = erfc (|a|)− exp(−a2)|a|√π < 0 from Reference [52]’s In-
equality (4) implies f ′(x) < 0 for x ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: We can write
f ′′(x) = exu(
√
a2 + x) for function u(y) defined by
u(y) := erfc (y)− exp(−y2)
y
√
π
(1− 12y2 ). We have u(y) > 0
from the asymptotic expansion (i.e., Inequality 7.12.1 in [52])
of the complementary error function erfc (·). Hence, the
desired result is proved.
Now we continue the proof of Theorem 2.
Propositions 2 and 3 induce f ′(x) ≤ f ′(ǫ) < 0 for
x ≥ 0. Then we have f(0) − f(ǫ) = − ∫ ǫx=0 f ′(x) dx ≥
− ∫ ǫx=0 f ′(ǫ) dx = −f ′(ǫ)ǫ, which implies
−f ′(ǫ) = exp(−a
2)√
π(a2 + ǫ)
− eǫ erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
≤ 2δ
ǫ
. (35)
For notation convenience, we define
A :=
√
a2 + ǫ. (36)
Then
exp(−A2)
A
√
π
− erfc (A) ≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) . (37)
From the inverse factorial series of the complementary error
function erfc (·) [52], it holds that
erfc (A)
≤ exp(−A
2)
A
√
π
[
1− 1
2(A2 + 1)
+
1
4(A2 + 1)(A2 + 2)
]
=
exp(−A2)
A
√
π
[
1− 2A
2 + 3
4(A2 + 1)(A2 + 2)
]
, (38)
which we use in the above Inequality (37) to obtain
exp(−A2)
A
√
π
· 2A
2 + 3
4(A2 + 1)(A2 + 2)
≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) . (39)
This further induces
exp(−A2)
≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) ·
4A · (A2 + 1)(A2 + 2)√π
2A2 + 3
≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) · 4A · (0.5A
2 + 0.75)
√
π, (40)
where the last step uses
(A2 + 1)(A2 + 2)− (2A2 + 3)(0.5A2 + 0.75)
= −0.25 < 0. (41)
Then
exp(−A2)
≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) · 4A · (0.5A
2 + 0.75)
√
π
≤ 2δ
ǫ · exp(ǫ) · 4
√
ln
1
δ
[
0.5
(√
ln
1
δ
)2
+ 0.75
]√
π. (42)
We consider 0 < δ ≤ 0.005. We can assume δ ≤ e−1.5. For
such δ ≤ e−1.5, it holds that
0.5
(√
ln
1
δ
)2
+ 0.75 ≤
(√
ln
1
δ
)2
, (43)
which we use in Inequality (42) to derive
exp(−A2) ≤ 8δ
(√
ln
1
δ
)3 √π
ǫ · exp(ǫ) . (44)
Then for δ ≤ e−1.5 and 8δ
(√
ln 1δ
)3√
π/ǫ ≤ 1, which clearly
holds given a fixed ǫ > 0 and δ → 0, we have
A ≥
√√√√ln ǫ · exp(ǫ)
8δ
(√
ln 1δ
)3√
π
=
√
ǫ+ ln
1
δ
+ ln
ǫ
8
√
π
− 3
2
ln ln
1
δ
. (45)
For ǫ ≥ 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 0.005, we can verify that • δ ≤ e−1.5,
• 8δ
(√
ln 1δ
)3√
π/ǫ ≤ 1, and ln ǫ
8
√
π
− 32 ln ln 1δ ≥ ln 18√π −
3
2 ln ln
1
0.005 > 0.0057. Hence,
A ≥
√
ln
1
δ
+ ln
ǫ
8
√
π
− 3
2
ln ln
1
δ
>
√
ln
0.0057
δ
, (46)
which implies
σDP-OPT
=
(
a+
√
a2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
=
(√
A2 − ǫ + A ) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
>
∆
ǫ
√
2
(√
ln
1
δ
+ ln 0.0057− ǫ+
√
ln
1
δ
+ ln 0.0057
)
.
(47)
Clearly, dividing the above lower bound of (47) by ∆ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ
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converges to 1 as δ → 0. Combining this with (34), we
complete proving Result ④ of Theorem 3. 
F. Proof of Lemma 10
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (31a) for ǫ > 0:
We write σDP-OPT of Theorem 2 as a function σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ).
Given a fixed 0 < δ < 0.5, clearly σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) strictly
decreases as ǫ increases, which implies for ǫ > 0 that
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) is less than limǫ→0 σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) (if such limit
exists). When ǫ → 0, a in Eq. (5) is negative and satisfies
erfc (a)−erfc (−a)→ 2δ so that a→ − inverfc(1−δ) due to
erfc (−a) = 2− erfc (a). This further implies for ǫ→ 0 that
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) =
(
a+
√
a2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
=
∆(−a+√a2 + ǫ ) · √2
→ ∆
2
√
2 · inverfc(1− δ) . (48)
Hence, for ǫ > 0, we have
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) < lim
ǫ→0
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ)
=
∆
2
√
2 · inverfc(1− δ)
=
∆
2
√
2 · inverf(δ) . (49)
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (31b) for ǫ > 0: Eq. (31b) follows
from Eq. (5) and Lemma 11 presented at the end of this
subsection.
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (32a) for 0 < δ < 0.5 and 0 <
ǫ ≤ ǫ∗:
We consider 0 < δ < 0.5 and 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗ here. In this case,
from Appendix D, a in Eq. (5) is negative or zero. Then we
have erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
< erfc (|a|) = erfc (−a), which along
with erfc (a) − eǫ erfc (√a2 + ǫ) = 2δ and erfc (a) = 2 −
erfc (−a) implies 2− erfc (−a)− eǫ erfc (−a) < 2δ. Then we
have erfc (−a) > 2−2δeǫ+1 , which along with the aforementioned
result a ≤ 0 implies
− inverfc
(
2− 2δ
eǫ + 1
)
< a ≤ 0. (50)
Thus,
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ)
=
(
a+
√
a2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
=
∆(−a+√a2 + ǫ ) · √2
>
∆
√
2 · {inverfc(2−2δeǫ+1 ) +
√
[inverfc(2−2δeǫ+1 )]
2 + ǫ}
. (51)
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (32b) for 0 < δ < 0.5 and ǫ > ǫ∗:
We consider 0 < δ < 0.5 and ǫ > ǫ∗ here. In this case, from
Appendix D, a in Eq. (5) is positive. Then σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ) =
(a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
>
√
ǫ·∆
ǫ
√
2
= ∆√
2ǫ
.
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (33a) for 0.5 ≤ δ < 1 and ǫ > 0:
The proof is similar to that for Eq. (32a) above. First, with
0.5 ≤ δ < 1 and ǫ > 0, from Appendix D, a in Eq. (5) is
negative. Then similar to the proof of Eq. (50), we have
− inverfc
(
2− 2δ
eǫ + 1
)
< a < 0. (52)
Then we also obtain Eq. (33a) in a way similar to the proof
of Eq. (51).
Proof of Lemma 10’s Eq. (33b) for 0.5 ≤ δ < 1 and ǫ > ǫ#:
Since eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) strictly decreases as ǫ increases
from Lemma 9 on Page 15, for ǫ# denoting the solution
to eǫ# erfc
(√
ǫ#
)
= 1 − δ, we have for ǫ > ǫ# that
eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) < eǫ# erfc
(√
ǫ#
)
= 1 − δ, which gives a lower
bound on a of Eq. (5):
a > inverfc
(
2δ + eǫ erfc
(√
ǫ
) )
> inverfc(1 + δ)
= − inverf(δ). (53)
Then
σDP-OPT(ǫ, δ)
=
(
a+
√
a2 + ǫ
) ·∆
ǫ
√
2
=
∆(−a+√a2 + ǫ ) · √2
>
∆(
inverf(δ) +
√
[inverf(δ)]2 + ǫ
)
· √2
. (54)

Lemma 11. a in Eq. (5) is less than inverfc(2δ).
Proof of Lemma 11: The result follows since Eq. (5) induces
erfc (a) = 2δ+eǫ erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
> 2δ and erfc (·) is a strictly
decreasing function.
G. Establishing Lemma 1, which along with Theorem 2 im-
plies Theorem 4
When eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) + 2δ ≥ 2, we have b = 0 from Eq. (7a)
on Page 6 and a ≤ 0 from Appendix D on Page 15, so the
desired result a ≤ b follows. Below we focus on the case of
eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) + 2δ < 2.
We use Theorem 2 to prove Theorem 4. In particular, we
will show that a specified in Eq. (5) is less than b defined
in Eq. (7a).
Recall that Eq. (5) presents
erfc (a)− eǫ erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ. (55)
We will find an upper bound for a and this upper bound will be
b. To this end, we will show erfc (a) is at least some fraction of
erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
. This will be done by i) proving a lower bound
for a, and ii) showing that
erfc(
√
u2+ǫ)
erfc(u) strictly increases as u
increases for u ∈ (−∞,∞).
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We first give a lower bound for a. From Eq. (55), we have
erfc (a) = 2δ + eǫ erfc
(√
a2 + ǫ
)
< 2δ + eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ), which
implies that if 2δ + eǫ erfc (
√
ǫ) < 2,
a > inverfc
(
2δ + eǫ erfc
(√
ǫ
) )
, (56)
where we note that the image domain of erfc (·) is (0, 2) since
the image domain of erf (·) is (−1, 1) and erfc (·) = 1−erf (·).
We now prove h(u) :=
erfc(
√
u2+ǫ)
erfc(u) strictly increases as u
increases for u ∈ (−∞,∞). Taking the derivative of h(u)
with respect to u, we obtain
h′(u) =
erfc′
(√
u2 + ǫ
)× erfc (u)− erfc (√u2 + ǫ)× erfc′ (u)
erfc2 (u)
=
2√
π
× exp(−u2)× κ(u)
erfc2 (u)
, (57)
for κ(u) defined by
κ(u) := − exp (−ǫ)× u√
u2 + ǫ
× erfc (u) + erfc
(√
u2 + ǫ
)
.
(58)
We will prove κ(u) > 0. To this end, we first investigate the
monotonicity of κ(u) for u ∈ (−∞,∞). Taking the derivative
of κ(u) with respect to u, we get
κ′(u) = exp (−ǫ)× u√
u2 + ǫ
× 2√
π
exp
(−u2)
− exp (−ǫ)×
√
u2 + ǫ− u2√
u2+ǫ
u2 + ǫ
× erfc (u)
− 2√
π
exp
(−u2 − ǫ)× u√
u2 + ǫ
= − exp (−ǫ)× ǫ
(u2 + ǫ)3/2
× erfc (u)
< 0. (59)
Hence, κ(u) strictly decreases as u increases for u ∈
(−∞,∞). Combining this and limu→∞ κ(u)erfc(u) := 1 −
exp (−ǫ) > 0, we conclude for u ∈ (−∞,∞) that κ(u)erfc(u) > 0
and hence κ(u) > 0. Thus, h′(u) in Eq. (57) is positive, so that
h(u) is increasing for u ∈ (−∞,∞). This along with Eq. (56)
implies
h(a) ≥ h (inverfc (2δ + eǫ erfc (√ǫ) )) . (60)
From Eq. (55) and (60), and h(a) :=
erfc(
√
a2+ǫ)
erfc(a) , we derive
erfc (a) =
2δ
1− eǫ · h(a)
≥ 2δ
1− eǫ · h (inverfc (2δ + eǫ erfc (√ǫ) ))
= erfc (b) , (61)
where the last step uses the expression of b in Eq. (7a). Hence,
it holds that a ≤ b. Then we obtain the desired result of
Theorem 2 implying Theorem 4. 
H. Establishing Lemma 2, which along with Theorem 4 im-
plies Theorem 5
From Eq. (61), it holds that erfc (b) > 2δ, which implies
b < inverfc(2δ). For 0 < δ < 0.5, we replace y in
Lemma 8 on Page 15 with 2δ to obtain inverfc(2δ) < c for
c :=
√
ln 2√
16δ+1−1 . Then we have b < c. Thus, Theorem 4
implies Theorem 5. 
I. Proof of Lemma 3
The sktech of the following proof is given in [2]. We present
the full details for completeness.
Recall that a mechanism Y achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy if
P [Y (x) ∈ Y] ≤ eǫP [Y (x′) ∈ Y ] + δ,
for any output set Y, neighboring datasets x and x′, (62)
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the
randomized mechanism Y , D and D′ iterate through all pairs
of neighboring datasets, and Y iterates through all subsets of
the output range.
To achieve (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we first show that it
suffices to ensure
P
[
F [Y (x) = y]
F [Y (x′) = y]
≤ eǫ
]
≥ 1− δ,
for any output y, neighboring datasets x and x′, (63)
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the
randomized mechanism Y , D and D′ iterate through all pairs
of neighboring datasets, and y iterates through the output range
O. Specifically, we will prove that Eq. (63) implies Eq. (62).
We define set S by
S :=
{
y
∣∣∣∣ F [Y (x) = y]F [Y (x′) = y] ≤ eǫ
}
. (64)
Then if Eq. (63) holds, we have
P [Y (x) ∈ S] ≥ 1− δ. (65)
With O being the output range, O \ S is the complement set
of S. Then Eq. (65) implies
P [Y (x) ∈ O \ S] = 1− P [Y (x) ∈ S] ≤ δ. (66)
To show that Eq. (63) implies Eq. (62), we have
P [Y (x) ∈ Y]
= P [Y (x) ∈ Y ∩ S] + P [Y (x) ∈ Y \ S]
=
∫
y∈Y∩S
F [Y (x) = y] dy + P [Y (x) ∈ Y \ S]
(*)
≤
∫
y∈Y∩S
eǫF [Y (x′) = y] dy + P [Y (x) ∈ O \ S]
(#)
≤ eǫP [Y (x′) ∈ Y ∩ S] + δ
≤ eǫF [Y (x′) ∈ Y ] + δ, (67)
where the above step (*) uses Eq. (64) and Y \ S ⊆ O \ S,
and step (#) uses Eq. (66). 
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J. Proof of Lemma 4
For neighboring datasets D and D′, the privacy loss
LY,D,D′(y) represents the multiplicative difference between
the probabilities that the same output y is observed when the
randomized algorithm Y is applied to D and D′, respectively.
Specifically, we define
LY,D,D′(y) := ln
F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
, (68)
where F [·] denotes the probability density function.
For simplicity, we use probability density function F [·] in
Eq. (11) above by assuming that the randomized algorithm Y
has continuous output. If Y has discrete output, we replace
F [·] by probability notation P [·].
When y follows the probability distribution of random
variable Y (D), LY,D,D′(y) follows the probability distribution
of random variable LY,D,D′(Y (D)).
We have Lemmas 12 and 13 below, which will be proved
soon.
Lemma 12. Given datasets D, D′, and an (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private randomized algorithm Y , for any real number t, it
holds that
P [LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≥ t] ≤ δ
1− eǫ−t . (69)
Lemma 13. The relationships between privacy loss random
variables LY,D,D′(Y (D)) and LY,D′,D(Y (D
′)) are as follows.
Given datasets D, D′, and a randomized algorithm Y , for any
real number t, it holds that
P [LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≤ −t] ≤ e−tP [LY,D′,D(Y (D′)) ≥ t] .
(70)
Proof of Lemma 4: The result follows from Lemmas 12
and 13. 
Proof of Lemma 12: Since LY,D,D′(Y (·)) can be seen as post-
processing on Y (·) and hence also satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, we have
P [LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≥ t]
≤ δ + eǫP [LY,D,D′(Y (D′)) ≥ t]
= δ + eǫ
∫
Y
F [Y (D′) = y]P [LY,D,D′(y) ≥ t] dy
= δ + eǫ
∫
Y
F [Y (D′) = y]P
[
F [Y (D) = y]
≥ etF [Y (D′) = y]
]
dy
≤ δ + eǫ
∫
Y
e−tF [Y (D) = y]P
[
F [Y (D) = y]
≥ etF [Y (D′) = y]
]
dy
= δ + eǫ−tP [LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≥ t] (71)

Proof of Lemma 13: We have
P [LY,D,D′(Y (D)) ≤ −t]
=
∫
Y
F [Y (D) = y]P
[
F [Y (D) = y]
≤ e−tF [Y (D′) = y]
]
dy
≤
∫
Y
e−tF [Y (D′) = y]P
[
F [Y (D′) = y]
≥ etF [Y (D) = y]
]
dy
= e−tP [LY,D′,D(Y (D′)) ≥ t] .

K. Proof of Theorem 6
For the proposed Gaussian mechanism, we now prove
Py∼Y (D)
[
e−ǫ ≤ F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
≤ eǫ
]
≥ 1− δ,
for any output y, neighboring datasets D and D′. (72)
The desired result Eq. (72) can also be written as
Py∼Y (D)
[∣∣∣∣ln F [Y (D) = y]F [Y (D′) = y]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ] ≥ 1− δ,
for any output y, neighboring datasets D and D′. (73)
With (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy being translated to Eq. (73), we
will show that the minimal noise amount can be derived, while
the classic mechanism by Dwork and Roth [2] presents only
a loose bound.
Let the output of the query Q on the dataset D be an m-
dimensional vector. We define notation r1, . . . , rm such that
y −Q(D) = [r1, . . . , rm]. (74)
Since Y (D) is the result of adding a zero-mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σ to Q(D), we have
F [Y (D) = y] =
m∏
j=1
(
1√
2πσ2
e−
rj
2
2σ2
)
. (75)
We introduce notation s1, . . . , sm such that
Q(D)−Q(D′) = [s1, . . . , sm]. (76)
From Eq. (74) and (76), it holds that
y −Q(D′) = [r1 + s1, . . . , rm + sm]. (77)
Since Y (D′) is the result of adding a zero-mean Gaussian
noise with standard deviation σ to Q(D′), we have
F [Y (D′) = y] =
m∏
j=1
(
1√
2πσ2
e−
(rj+sj)
2
2σ2
)
. (78)
The combination of Eq. (75) and (78) induces
ln
F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
= ln
∏m
j=1
(
1√
2πσ2
e−
rj
2
2σ2
)
∏m
j=1
(
1√
2πσ2
e−
(rj+sj)
2
2σ2
)
=
m∑
j=1
[
(rj + sj)
2
2σ2
− rj
2
2σ2
]
=
∑m
j=1(sjrj)
σ2
+
∑m
j=1 sj
2
2σ2
. (79)
We define
S :=
√√√√ m∑
j=1
sj2, (80)
and
G :=
∑m
j=1(sjrj)
S
. (81)
20
From Eq. (76), S is the ℓ2 distance between Q(D) and Q(D
′);
i.e.,
S := ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2. (82)
Note that rj for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} defined in Eq. (74) is a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable with standard deviation
σ. In addition, r1, . . . , rm are independent. Hence,
G defined as
∑m
j=1(sjrj)
S
is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with variance
∑m
j=1(sj
2σ2)
S2
= σ2, (83)
where the last step uses Eq. (80). For notational simplicity, we
write G ∼ Gaussian(0, σ2).
From Eq. (80) and (81), it follows that
ln
F [Y (D) = y]
F [Y (D′) = y]
=
GS
σ2
+
S2
2σ2
. (84)
Hence, we have
Py∼Y (D)
[∣∣∣∣ln F [Y (D) = y]F [Y (D′) = y]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ]
= PG∼Gaussian(0,σ2)
[∣∣∣∣GSσ2 + S22σ2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ] . (85)
If S > 0, given the result Eq. (81) that G is a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with standard deviation σ, we obtain
PG∼Gaussian(0,σ2)
[∣∣∣∣GSσ2 + S22σ2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ]
= P
[
− ǫσ
2
S
− S
2
≤ G ≤ ǫσ
2
S
− S
2
]
=
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
ǫσ2
S − S2
σ
√
2
)]
− 1
2
[
1 + erf
(
− ǫσ2S − S2
σ
√
2
)]
=
1
2
erf
(
ǫσ2
S − S2
σ
√
2
)
+
1
2
erf
(
ǫσ2
S +
S
2
σ
√
2
)
= fǫ, σ(S), (86)
for fǫ, σ(S) defined by
fǫ, σ(S) :=
1
2
[
erf
(
ǫσ2
S − S2
σ
√
2
)
+ erf
(
ǫσ2
S +
S
2
σ
√
2
)]
, (87)
where Eq. (86) uses the cumulative distribution function of a
zero-mean Gaussian random variable G as well as the fact that
erf(·) is an odd function; i.e., erf(−x) = − erf(x).
If S = 0, it is clear that
PG∼Gaussian(0,σ2)
[∣∣∣∣GSσ2 + S22σ2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ] = 1. (88)
The ℓ2-sensitivity ∆ of the query Q is the maximal
ℓ2 distance between the (true) query outputs for any two
neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ in one record:
∆ = maxneighboring D,D′ ‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2. From Eq. (82),
we have 0 ≤ S ≤ ∆. Then summarizing Eq. (86) and (88), to
guarantee Eq. (73), it suffices to ensure
fǫ, σ(S) ≥ 1− δ, for 0 < S ≤ ∆. (89)
We can prove that fǫ, σ(S) is a decreasing function of S.
Hence, the optimal Gaussian mechanism to achieve (ǫ, δ)-
probabilistic differential privacy satisfies fǫ, σ(∆) = 1 − δ.
Defining d as
ǫσ2
∆ −∆2
σ
√
2
and solving σ, we obtain the desired
result. 
L. Proof of Theorem 7
① Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, we have limǫ→0 d = inverfc(δ),
which results in limǫ→0 σpDP-OPT
/(
inverfc(δ)·∆
ǫ
√
2
)
= 1.
② Given a fixed 0 < δ < 1, we have limǫ→∞ d = 0, which
leads to limǫ→∞ σpDP-OPT
/(
∆√
2ǫ
)
= 1.
③ Given a fixed ǫ > 0, we use Lemma 5
to derive limδ→0 d
√
ln 1δ = 1 and thus
limδ→0 σpDP-OPT
/(
∆
ǫ
√
2 ln 1δ
)
= 1. 
M. Establishing Lemma 5, which along with Theorem 6 im-
plies Theorem 8
From the definition of d in Eq. (13a): erfc (d) +
erfc
(√
d2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ, we clearly have δ < erfc (d) < 2δ,
which implies inverfc(2δ) < d < inverfc(δ). 
N. Proving Lemma 6, which along with Theorem 8 implies
Theorem 9
To show Lemma 6, it suffices to prove
√
ln 2√
8δ+1−1 >
inverfc(δ) for 0 < δ < 1. This clearly follows from Lemma 8
proved in Appendix Q by replacing y with δ.
O. Algorithm 1 to compute σDP-OPT of Theorem 2
As discussed at the end of Section V, the noise amounts of
our mechanisms can be set as initial values to quickly search
for the optimal value σDP-OPT. In particular, Algorithm 1 to
compute σDP-OPT will use Lemma 14 below.
Lemma 14. We have the following bounds for a in Eq. (5) of
Theorem 2:
0 < a < b of Eq. (7a)
< c of Eq. (9), if 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)>2δ; (90a)
a=0, if 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)=2δ;(90b)
− inverfc
(
2−2δ
eǫ+1
)
<a<0, if 1−eǫ erfc (√ǫ)<2δ. (90c)
Proof of Lemma 14: First, (90a) follows from Lemmas 1
and 2. Second, (90b) holds from Eq. (5) and Remark 4. Next,
we prove Eq. (90c) as follows.
From Lemma 9 on Page 15, we have
If 0.5 ≤ δ < 1,
then any ǫ > 0 satisfies
1− eǫ erfc (√ǫ) < 2δ.
If 0 < δ < 0.5, then 0 < ǫ < ǫ∗ satisfies
1− eǫ erfc (√ǫ) < 2δ,
where ǫ∗ denotes the solution to eǫ∗ erfc (
√
ǫ∗) = 1− 2δ.
Then we use Eq. (50) and (52) to obtain (90c). 
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Algorithm 1 Computing σDP-OPT of Theorem 2 based on
Lemma 14.
1: diff← 1− eǫ erfc (√ǫ)− 2δ;
2: if diff = 0 then
3: a← 0;
4: else if diff > 0 then
5: N← 1;
6: lower← 0;
7: upper← any one of the following:
b of Eq. (7a) in our Theorem 4 for Mechanism 1,
c of Eq. (9) in our Theorem 5 for Mechanism 2;
8: while N ≤ the allowed maximum number of iterations
do
9: if upper− lower < tolerance then
10: a← upper;
11: break
12: end if
13: mid← (lower + upper)/2;
14: if erfc (mid)− eǫ erfc
(√
mid2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ then
15: a← mid;
16: break
17: else if erfc (mid)− eǫ erfc
(√
mid2 + ǫ
)
> 2δ then
18: lower← mid;
19: else
20: upper← mid;
21: end if
22: N ← N + 1;
23: end while
24: else
25: N← 1;
26: lower← − inverfc
(
2−2δ
eǫ+1
)
;
27: upper← 0;
28: while N ≤ the allowed maximum number of iterations
do
29: if upper− lower < tolerance then
30: a← upper;
31: break
32: end if
33: mid← (lower + upper)/2;
34: if erfc (mid)− eǫ erfc
(√
mid2 + ǫ
)
= 2δ then
35: a← mid;
36: break
37: else if erfc (mid)− eǫ erfc
(√
mid2 + ǫ
)
> 2δ then
38: lower← mid;
39: else
40: upper← mid;
41: end if
42: N ← N + 1;
43: end while
44: end if
45: σDP-OPT ← (a+
√
a2+ǫ )·∆
ǫ
√
2
;
46: return σDP-OPT
Note that in practice, due to ǫ ≥ 0.01 and δ ≤ 0.05, we
have (90a) as explained in Appendix D. We present (90b) and
(90c) for completeness.
To ensure σ returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies
0 ≤ σ − σDP-OPT ≤ ζ for some ζ ≥ 0, we clearly have
the following results on the computational complexity of
Algorithm 1:
• If 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ) > 2δ, then Algorithm 1 takes at most
log2
b
ζ iterations (resp., log2
c
ζ ) if Line 7 uses b of Eq. (7a)
(resp., c of Eq. (9)), with each iteration having O(1)
complexity. The total complexity is O
(
log2
b
ζ
)
(resp.,
O
(
log2
c
ζ
)
).
• If 1 − eǫ erfc (√ǫ) < 2δ, then Algorithm 1 takes
at most log2
inverfc( 2−2δexp(ǫ)+1 )
ζ iterations, with each itera-
tion having O(1) complexity. The total complexity is
O
(
log2
inverfc( 2−2δexp(ǫ)+1 )
ζ
)
.
P. Analyses of (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy and (ǫ, δ)-
Probabilistic Differential Privacy for the Composition
of Gaussian Mechanisms
This section provides analyses of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
and (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy for the composition
of Gaussian mechanisms.
Lemma 15. Form queriesQ1, Q2, . . . , Qm with ℓ2-sensitivity
∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆m, if the query result of Qi is added with
independent Gaussian noise of standard deviation σi, we have
the following results.
i) The differential privacy (DP) level for the composition of
the m noisy answers is the same as that of a Gaussian
mechanism with noise amount
σ∗ :=
(
m∑
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
)−1/2
(92)
for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1.
ii) The probabilistic differential privacy (pDP) level for the
composition of the m noisy answers is the same as that of
a Gaussian mechanism with noise amount σ∗ in Eq. (92)
for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1.
Remark 9.
• Result i) of Lemma 15 implies the following. Let σDPǫ,δ
be a Gaussian noise amount which achieves (ǫ, δ)-DP
for a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1, where the expression of
σDPǫ,δ can follow from classical ones Dwork-2006 and
Dwork-2014 of [1], [2] (when ǫ ≤ 1), the optimal
one DP-OPT of Theorem 2, or our proposed mechanisms
Mechanism 1 of Theorem 4 and Mechanism 2 of
Theorem 5. Then the above composition satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP
for ǫ and δ satisfying σ∗ ≥ σDPǫ,δ with σ∗ defined above.
• Result ii) of Lemma 15 implies the following. Let σpDPǫ,δ be
a Gaussian noise amount which achieves (ǫ, δ)-pDP for a
query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1, where the expression of σ
pDP
ǫ,δ
can follow the optimal one, or our proposed mechanisms.
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Then the above composition satisfies (ǫ, δ)-pDP for ǫ and
δ satisfying σ∗ ≥ σpDPǫ,δ with σ∗ defined above.
Proof of Lemma 15:
We consider m queries Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm with ℓ2-sensitivity
∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆m. The query result of Qi on dataset D is added
with independent Gaussian noise of standard deviation σi, in
order to generate a noisy version Q˜i(D).
We first state a result for a general query Q. Let the query
result of Q on dataset D be added with Gaussian noise of
standard deviation σ, in order to generate a noisy version
Q˜(D). From Eq. (82) (83) and (84), we obtain:
with y following the probability distribution of Q˜(D)
(i.e., a Gaussian distribution with mean Q(D)
and standard deviation σ),
the term ln
F[Q˜(D)=y]
F[Q˜(D′)=y]
obeys a Gaussian distribution
with mean
[‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2]2
2σ2 and variance
[‖Q(D)−Q(D′)‖2]2
σ2 .
(93)
Let Q˜ be the composition of mechanisms Q˜1, Q˜2, . . . , Q˜m.
Let yi follow the probability distribution of Q˜i(D), and let
y be the composition of y1, y2, . . . , ym, which means that
y follow the probability distribution of Q˜(D). Following
Eq. (11), the privacy loss function of Q on neighbouring
datasets D and D′ can be defined as
L
Q˜,D,D′(y) = ln
F
[
Q˜(D) = y
]
F
[
Q˜(D′) = y
]
= ln
F
[
∩mi=1
[
Q˜i(D) = yi
]]
F
[
∩mi=1
[
Q˜i(D′) = yi
]] . (94)
Since Q˜1, Q˜2, . . . , Q˜m are independent, we further have
L
Q˜,D,D′(y) =
m∑
i=1
ln
F
[
Q˜i(D) = yi
]
F
[
Q˜i(D′) = yi
] . (95)
From (93), ln
F[Q˜i(D)=yi]
F[Q˜i(D′)=yi]
follows a Gaussian
distribution with mean
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
2σi2
and variance
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
σi2
. Then from (95), L
Q˜,D,D′(y) follows a
Gaussian distribution with mean
∑m
i=1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
2σi2
and variance
∑m
i=1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
σi2
.
To account for the privacy level of Q˜, both (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy and (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy can be
given by conditions on L
Q˜,D,D′(y) for any pair of neighboring
datasets D and D′. In particular, from Theorem 5 of [22], Q˜
achieves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if and only if Py∼Q˜(D)[LQ˜,D,D′(y) > ǫ]
−eǫP
y∼Q˜(D)[LQ˜,D,D′(y) < −ǫ]
 ≤ δ, (96)
for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′.
From Definition 2, Q˜ achieves (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential
privacy if and only if
P
y∼Q˜(D)[
∣∣L
Q˜,D,D′(y)
∣∣ > ǫ] ≤ δ, (97)
for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′.
Our analysis above shows that L
Q˜,D,D′(y) follows a Gaus-
sian distribution with mean A(D,D′) and variance A(D,D
′)
2
for A(D,D′) :=
∑m
i=1
[‖Qi(D)−Qi(D′)‖2]2
2σi2
. Since ‖Qi(D) −
Qi(D
′)‖2 is at most the ℓ2-sensitivity ∆i of query Qi,
the term A(D,D′) is no greater than
∑m
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
. Lemma 7
of [22] proves that the left hand side of Eq. (96) strictly
increases when A(D,D′) increases. Hence, Q˜ achieves (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy if for L∗ obeying a Gaussian distribution
with mean A∗ and variance A
∗
2 for A
∗ :=
∑m
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
, we have
P[L∗ > ǫ]− eǫP[L∗ < −ǫ] ≤ δ. (98)
From (93) above and [22]’s Theorem 5, Inequality (98) is
also the condition to ensure that answering a query with ℓ2-
sensitivity 1 and Gaussian noise amount 1√
A∗
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
Similarly, Q˜ achieves (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy
if for L∗ obeying a Gaussian distribution with mean A∗ and
variance A
∗
2 for A
∗ :=
∑m
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
, we have
P[|L∗| > ǫ] ≤ δ. (99)
From (93) above, Inequality (99) is also the condition to ensure
that answering a query with ℓ2-sensitivity 1 and Gaussian noise
amount 1√
A∗
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy.
With the above results and 1√
A∗
=
(∑m
i=1
∆i
2
σi2
)−1/2
,
Lemma 15 is proved. 
Q. Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma 8 (Restated). For 0 < y < 1, it holds that
inverfc(y) <
√
ln 2√
8y+1−1 .
Proof: We define a function g(·) as
g(x) =
1
2
exp(−2x2) + 1
2
exp(−x2). (100)
Then we derive for 0 < y < 1 that
g−1(y) =
√
ln
2√
8y + 1 − 1 . (101)
We relate Lemma 8 with the result
erfc(x) < g(x), for x > 0. (102)
The rest of the proof includes two parts: i) using (102) to show
Lemma 8, and ii) proving (102).
Using (102) to show Lemma 8:
We replace x by g−1(y) in Eq. (102), and thus obtain
g(g−1(y)) > erfc(g−1(y)). (103)
The term g(g−1(y)) in Eq. (103) equals y and can also be
written as erfc(inverfc(y)); i.e., we can express Eq. (103) as
follows:
erfc(inverfc(y)) > erfc(g−1(y)). (104)
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As erfc() is a decreasing function, Eq. (104) implies
inverfc(y) < g−1(y). (105)
From Eq. (101), we know that g−1(y) in Eq. (105) equals√
ln 2√
8y+1 − 1 . Hence, Eq. (105) above means Lemma 8.
Proving (102):
The complementary error function erfc(x) equals
2√
π
∫∞
x
e−t
2
dt. We will prove another form of the
complementary error function for x ≥ 0. Specifically,
we will show
erfc(x) =
2
π
∫ π
2
0
exp
(
− x
2
sin2 θ
)
dθ, for x ≥ 0. (106)
The right hand side of Eq. (106) is an alternative form of the
complementary error function, and is known as Craig’s for-
mula [53] in the literature. Yet, to show Eq. (106), Craig [53]
uses empirical arguments and not many studies present a
rigorous proof. Below we formally establish Eq. (106) for
completeness.
Given 2√
π
∫∞
0
e−s
2
ds = erfc(0) = 1, we now write erfc(x)
(i.e., 2√
π
∫∞
x
e−t
2
dt) as follows:
2√
π
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2
dt
=
2√
π
∫ ∞
0
e−s
2
ds · 2√
π
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2
dt
=
4
π
∫ ∞
0
e−s
2
ds
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2
dt. (107)
We express the integral of Eq. (107) in polar coordinates.
Specifically, under s = r cos θ and t = r sin θ, the intervals
s ∈ [0,∞) and t ∈ [x,∞) correspond to r ∈ [x/ sin θ,∞)
and θ ∈ [0, π2 ]. Also, it holds that dsdt = rdrdθ. Then the
right hand side (RHS) of Eq. (107) is given by
RHS of Eq. (107) =
4
π
∫ π
2
0
dθ
∫ ∞
x/ sin θ
re−r
2
dr
=
4
π
∫ π
2
0
dθ
(
−1
2
e−y
2
) ∣∣∣∣y=∞
y=x/ sin θ
=
2
π
∫ π
2
0
exp
(
− x
2
sin2 θ
)
dθ. (108)
Summarizing Eq. (107) and Eq. (108), we have proved
Eq. (106). To further bound erfc(x) based on Eq. (106), we
obtain for x > 0 that
2
π
∫ π
2
0
exp
(
− x
2
sin2 θ
)
dθ
<
2
π
∫ π
4
0
exp
(
− x
2
sin2 π4
)
dθ +
2
π
∫ π
2
π
4
exp(−x2)dθ
=
2
π
· π
4
· exp(−2x2) + 2
π
· π
4
· exp(−x2)
= g(x),
which along with Eq. (106) gives (102).
Since we have shown (102) and the result that (102) implies
Lemma 8, we complete proving Lemma 8. 
